A STUDY OF ŚĀNTARAKṢITA'S
MADHYAMAKĀLAṂKĀRA

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
For the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the

Department of Far Eastern Studies

by

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Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

c 1979. Kennard Lipman

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Abstract

The aim of this study is to survey the major philosophical themes of Śāntirakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* (*MAl*). We have isolated these themes into five major issues according to the major Tibetan commentary on this work, the *dBu-ma rgyan gyi rnam-bshad 'jam-dbyangs bla-ma dgyes-pa'i zhal-lung* of Mi-pham rgya-mtsho (1846-1912).

The *Introduction* surveys the history of the text and discusses some of the reasons for its neglect among traditional and modern scholars, this being the first major study and translation of the *MAl* in a Western language. The work is also set against the general background of the development of the Madhyamaka tradition in Tibet.

In the first chapter, the "methodology" of our study is outlined. We demonstrate the relevance of modern hermeneutical theories, particularly those of Hans-Georg Gadamer, for the concrete practice of text translation. The importance of the study of modern philosophy is stressed as a means whereby the translator can come to terms with his contemporary prejudices. Phenomenological philosophy is singled out as a tool for working with the issues of the *MAl*.

In the second chapter, the first two major issues are discussed, <u>arthakriyātva</u> (causal efficacy as the distinguishing characteristic of conventional reality) and <u>svasaṃvedana</u> (reflexive, non-referential awareness as the distinguishing characteristic of the mental). First, Mi-pham's introduction to these issues are translated, and then the appropriate sections of the <u>MAl</u> are likewise presented.

The third chapter follows the same pattern in dealing with the third major issue, Śāntarakṣita's integration of the Yogācāra tradition into his Svātantrika-Madhyamaka philosophy. A long introduction is provided on the relationship of the Yogācāra and Madhyamaka traditions, and their respective approaches to perception are considered in the light of a phenomenology of perception.

The fourth chapter focuses on the final two issues, which concern the specific Svātantrika contribution of the division of the ultimate truth into discursively-formulated and non-discursive aspects. Of special interest is Mi-pham's extensive commentary on these, which is considered in the context of the controversies Mi-pham was engaged in over interpretation of the Madhyamaka in the late 19th century.

Four appendices are attached, including a translation of the <u>Madhyamakālaṃkārakārikā</u> and Mi-pham's commentary on <u>Bodhicaryāvatāra</u> IX,2, which deals with the relationship of the Prāsangikas and the Svātantrikas.

Acknowledgements

I gratefully acknowledge the guidance and patient indulgence shown by my thesis advisor, Dr. H.V. Guenther, in my years as a graduate student in the Department of Far Eastern Studies. I would also like to thank the University of Saskatchewan for the financial support they have provided over the years, despite the meager results; as well as the Department of Religious Studies, University of Calgary, for hiring me as a Sessional Instructor during my last year of research. I would also like to thank all the members of that Department for making my stay there a fruitful one, especially Dr. L.S. Kawamura.

I am also grateful to Dr. Masamichi Ichigo, of Kyoto Sangyo University, Japan, for sending me some introductory materials to his unpublished Japanese translation and critical edition of the <u>MAl</u>, which greatly aided in the identification of verses and quotations in the <u>MAl</u>.

Special thanks are also due to my wife, Huisun, who helped with the typing and her constantly selfless attitude.

May this work be of some small value to whomever may chance to read it, although it was primarily written to clarify my own considerable ignorance.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements p. i

Introduction: The Text and Its Fate p. 1

Chapter I: The Method of No Method: What is it to Understand? p. 16

Chapter II: Major Issues of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra: Arthakriyākāritva and Svasaṃvedana p. 27

Chapter III: Major Issues of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra: The Cittamātra and its Madhyamaka Critique p. 61

Chapter IV: Major Issues of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra: How to Jump Over One's Own Shadow p. 100

Appendices:

1. Translation of the Madhyamakālaṃkārakārikā p. 126
2. Topical Outline (sa-bcad) of Mi-pham's dBu-ma rgyan rnam-bshad p. 147
3. Mi-pham on Bodhicaryāvatāra IX,2 p. 162
4. Profound Instructions for Understanding the Mādhyamika by Mi-pham p. 170

Bibliography p. 175

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION: THE TEXT AND ITS FATE

The story of Śāntarakṣita's sojourn in Tibet is well-known, but this is so mostly because of its symbolic content: the failure of Śāntarakṣita's exoteric pāramitā-yāna to impress itself upon the Tibetan "barbarians" and their land, and the success of Padmasambhava's esoteric mantrayāna in doing so. Śāntarakṣita's two major works, the encyclopedic textbook of Indian philosophy, the Tattvasaṃgraha, and a presentation of his own approach to Madhyamaka philosophy, the Madhyamakālaṃkāra (along with his disciple, Kamalaśīla's pañjikā on each), spawned almost no Tibetan commentarial tradition.[1] The translation of our text into Tibetan, made in the early period, is often obscure, but was not revised during the period of "New Tranalations" (phyi-'gyur). Tsong-kha-pa has left us some incomplete notes (zin-bris) on the dbu-ma rgyan,[2] and his gsung-'bum also contains the rgyal-tshab chos-rjes-la gsan-pa'i dbu-ma rgyan-gyi brjed-byang, a guide written by rGyal-tshab according to Tsong-kha-pa's instructions. Only in the nineteenth century do we find a rNying-ma-pa scholar of the ris-med movement, Mi-pham rgya-mtsho (1846-1912), writing an extensive commentary, the dBu-ma rgyan-gyi rnam shad 'jam-dbyangs bla-ma dgyes-pa'i zhal-lung.[3] Mi-pham wrote commentaries on all the major Indian Mahāyāna śāstras, presenting a rNying-ma-pa position in this vast field of

scholastic exegesis, to an extent never developed before among the rNying-ma-pas.

It will become clear in the course of our studies why Mi-pham decided to resurrect the dbu-ma rgyan, as it were. He was particularly concerned to present what he considered to be a proper understanding of the relationship of the Svātantrikas to the Prāsangikas, which had become dogmatically rigidified, in his view, over the long course of Prāsangika dominance in Tibet. The source of this viewpoint, of course, being Candrakīrti's attack on Bhāvaviveka in the introduction to the first chapter of his Prasannapadā.[4] Mi-pham's dbu-ma rgyan commentary must be read in the overall context of the polemics engendered by his commentary on the ninth chapter of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the Shes-rab le'u'i tshig-don go sla-bar rnam-par bshad-pa nor-bu ke-ta-ka.[5] In fact, in the midst of his commentary on BCA IX,2, one of the prime sources of controversy, Mi-pham expressly refers his readers to his commentary on the dbu-ma rgyan, for a more extensive treatment of the issue regarding the Svātantrika and Prāsangika approaches to the Two Truths.[6] Because of this, we have included a translation of sections of Mi-pham's commentary on BCA IX,2 in an appendix.[7]

Here we must make some remarks on the history of the Madhyamaka in Tibet. We know, from the ldan-kar catalogue, that very few of what later came to be known as Prāsangika texts were translated in the early period, i.e., only five

works of Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti, and Śāntideva, as opposed to a dozen texts of Bhāvaviveka, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla (a dozen works of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, who antedate any split, were also translated).[8] Ye-shes-sde, in his contemporaneous _lTa-ba khyad-par_, which along with the _dbu-ma rgyan_ and Bhāvaviveka's _Tarkajvālā_, provided the early models for the Tibetan _grub-mtha'_ genre of literature, divided the Madhyamaka into two, the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka.[9] The eleventh-century rNying-ma-pa scholar of Madhyamaka and rDzogs-chen, Rong-zom chos-kyi bzang-po, also knows only this distinction among the Mādhyamikas.[10] The terms _rang-rgyud-pa_ and _thal-'gyur-ba_ only come to designate different "schools" around the time of Bu-ston. It is interesting to note that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla never mention Candrakīrti by name, although it is clear that they were aware of critiques of the _svātantra_ approach such as Candrakīrti made, verses 76-78 of the _MAl_ being devoted exclusively to such objections. In his commentary on _MAl_ 1, Kamalaśīla does use the terms _rang-rgyud-pa_ and _thal-'gyur-ba_, but they refer only to argument forms.[11]

The first _kārikā_ of the _Madhyamakālaṃkāra_ is indeed a classic example of a Svātantrika syllogism, which is characterized by the fact that its statement of the means of proof (_hetu_) is qualified by the term "ultimately," and that it has no negative example (_vipakṣa_). The rest of the work is actually just a defense of this syllogism, which

runs as follows (with technical terms for all elements of the syllogism provided in Sanskrit and Tibetan, with their commonly-employed English translations):[12]

THESIS (pratijñā, dam-bca')

"These particular existents spoken of by ourselves and others (locus, pakṣa, phyogs; or logical subject, dharmin, chos-can) are without essential existence (probandum, what is to be proved, sādhya, bsgrub-bya; or pakṣa-dharma, phyogs-chos),"

REASON (probans, means of proof, hetu, gtan-tshigs; or sādhana, sgrub-pa)

"Because they are ultimately neither unitary nor multiple (hetu, sādhana; or logical mark, liṅga, rtags);"

EXAMPLE (dṛṣṭānta, dpe)

"Like a mirror-image (positive example, sapaksa, mthun-pa'i phyogs)."

The reason (hetu) of this syllogism (minus the qualifier, "ultimately," of course) is also one of the four (or five) gtan-tshigs employed by the Prāsangikas of Tibet, known as gcig-du bral, which is to be found in verse fifty of Atiśa's Bodhipathapradīpa. This text provides the source for the codification of these argument-forms in Tibet, which are to be found in verses 48-51.[13] According to Mi-pham, the argument-form gcig-du bral deals with the factuality (ngo-bo) of the entities under examination, whereas the rdo-rje gzegs-ma deals with their "cause," while the yod-med skye bral (or 'gog) examines entities as results.[14] Thus, both the Svātantrikas and the Prāsangikas want to demonstrate that neither unity nor multiplicity can be established regarding any

entity or entities.

Śāntarakṣita introduces and comments on this verse as follows:

"If one who sets forth independently to establish the welfare of oneself and others, understands that all that is enjoyed merely through a lack of examination of particular existents, is ultimately without essential existence like a mirror-image, etc., then the various emotional and intellectual obscurations will be eliminated. Therefore, exert yourself in order to realize that all the entities taught by scripture and reasoned inquiry are without essential existence. In regard to this, even faithful followers will not be completely satisfied by scripture without (backing it up by) inferences which are in conformity with reality (dngos-po'i stobs-kyis zhugs-pa'i rjes-su dpag-pa, vastubalapravṛttānumāna). Because of this, I shall expound above all (according to) a reasoned inquiry.... If an essential existence existed, it would not pass beyond individuality or multiplicity. These are mutually exclusive; since this always holds (gnas-pa'i mtshan-nyid yin-pas), it excludes any other possibility. The psychophysical constituents (skandha), primordial material (prakṛti), etc., of ourselves and the outsiders, really do not exist, and should be clearly known to be without essential existence. If one thinks

that this syllogism is not proved, do not think so."[15]

Kamalaśīla adds:

> "Is this established by demonstrating unacceptable consequences to an opponent based on his own principles (thal-bar gyur-pa), or is it established through one's own acceptance of certain premises (rang-gi rgyud-kyi sgrub-pa)? One may think: if it is thought to be the first, then at that time, the argument is not proved because others do not accept freedom from individuality and multiplicity regarding particular existents. How about if it is the second? In that case (one may also think), it is really not proven, since a real basis (gzhi) is not accepted by oneself, and since, even in regard to the opponent, actuality (rang-gi ngo-bo) is not established. Thus, regarding the usefulness (of this syllogism) it is said (by Śāntarakṣita), 'If you think that this syllogism is not proved, do not think so' (in order to counter these claims)."[16]

Mi-pham in turn explains[17] that one can choose either the svātantra or prāsanga approach depending upon whether one starts with what is generally accepted (grags) in the world or not. In the case of the svātantra form of argument, the objection is that, since the opponent accepts logical reasons (rtags, liṅga), it is necessary to prove the reason "free from individuality and multiplicity" according to the canons of logic, i.e., the reason must satisfy the three as-

pects of a correct reason. These are, that it be a property of the locus, that it be present in a positive example, and that it be absent in a counter-example. But if the logical subject, i.e., the locus, is not established, then there is no means for establishing a property of this subject, i.e., that which is to be proved. Thus Śāntarakṣita goes on to show (in verses 2-60) that the property (paksa-dharma) is established in the locus (paksa).

In the case of the prāsanga, the objection is that the opponent doesn't directly accept the conclusion, "free from individuality and multiplicity," but since he does accept what may be entailed by (khyab-pa, vyāpti) his position, for example, that a single, eternal creator produces many results, it can be shown that this contradicts the individuality and eternity of the creator, because results are seen to come about gradually according to causes and conditions.[18] In conclusion, the important point is that the argument, "free from individuality and multiplicity," is found among both the Svātantrikas and the Prāsangikas, the difference between the two being one of method. Later (chapter IV), when we discuss the two forms of the ultimate truth, discursive and non-discursive (paryāya and aparyāya-paramārtha, rnam-grangs and rnam-grangs ma-yin-pa'i don-dam), introduced by the Svātantrikas, we shall bring out the deeper ontological reasons for this difference in method.

To return to the history of the Prāsangikas and the

Svātantrikas in Tibet: we have already seen that the Svātantrikas naturally predominated in the early period under the influence of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Even at the start of the later spread (<u>phyi-dar</u>) of Buddhism,[19] the Svātantrika remained predominant in the form of the teachings of rNog lo-tsa-ba blo-ldan shes-rab, who taught according to Bhāvaviveka's <u>Prajñāpradīpa</u> at gSang-phu, just south of Lhasa. The fifth abbot in the succession there was Phywa-pa chos-kyi senge, whose most famous students were known as the "Eight Great Lions" (such as gTsang nag-pa brtson-'grus senge and rMa bya-ba rtsod-pa'i senge). The majority of these students of Phywa-pa, led by gTsang nag-pa and rMa bya-ba, came to follow the interpretation of the <u>Madhyamakakārikā</u> by Candrakīrti, while the others, as well as Rong-ston shes-bya kun-gzigs (1367-1449), continued to follow the Svātantrika of Kamalaśīla, along with some rNying-ma-pa study centers (<u>chos-grva</u>). Why all this was so awaits further detailed study of the period.

It was Pa-tshab lo-tsa-ba, however, who introduced the Prāsangika approach during the later spread when he went to study with Sajjana (eleventh century) or his disciples. It was said he studied there in Kashmir for twenty-three years, and then translated the <u>Madhyamakakārikā</u>, the <u>Madhyamakāvatāra</u>, and the <u>Catuḥśataka</u>. From his students, known as the "Four Sons of Pa-tshab" (Gangs-pa She'u, gTsang-pa 'bre-sgur, rMa bya byang-brtson, and Zhang-thang sag-pa ye-shes 'byung

gnas), came the great majority in Tibet who follow this trend, such as Sa-skya pandita, Bu-ston rin-chen grub, Red mda'-ba, Tsong-kha-pa, Padma dkar-po, etc. It is only about Tsong-kha-pa's time (1357-1419) that the Prāsangikas assumed the pre-eminence they have maintained to the present day among Tibetans.[20]

All this is good reason for the neglect of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra among modern scholars. Only two articles on the text have appeared in Western languages, both by Japanese scholars, one a brief table of contents (sa-bcad), the other a summary of much of the kārikās.[21] Another reason for the neglect is that the work survives only in its Tibetan translation, while no translation is to be found in Chinese. Mi-pham's commentary follows Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla closely, offering an interlinear commentary on the kārikās and then expanding on and clarifying the commentaries of the Indian masters. Mi-pham also engages in extensive discussion of issues of concern to him (particularly at vv. 64, 71-2, 75, and 83), as mentioned above. Thus, Mi-pham's commentary is invaluable, although it forces the reader dealing with it to attempt to fill in the gap of no less than the whole history of the Madhyamaka in Tibet which lies between him and its founders. Mi-pham's commentary also has a long general introduction (ff. 2b-39b) surveying aspects of Cittamātra and Madhyamaka philosophy, which in-

cludes a section on "The five special positions in the approach (of the dbu-ma rgyan) which are superior to other Madhyamaka (presentations)," which provides the structure for our study.[22]

A final reason for the neglect of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra is the intrinsic difficulty of the text. In it (and thus in his Yogācāra-Mādhyamika-Svātantrika approach) Śāntarakṣita has woven together the three major movements in Indian Mahāyāna philosophy: the experiential phenomenology of the Yogācāras, the dialectics of the Mādhyamikas, and the epistemology and logic of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. I think it can safely be said that Buddhist philosophy after Śāntarakṣita in India is a series of footnotes and technical refinements. Not that Śāntarakṣita accomplished this alone, for it was Bhāvaviveka and Jñānagarbha[23] who led the way in the Svātantrika endeavor. Bhāvya's Svātantrika has only itself been fragmentarily studied in articles by Kajiyama, Iida, and Eckel,[24] while Candrakīrti's critique is well-known.[25] Chapters of Śāntarakṣita's massive Tattvasaṃgraha have been mined over and over again by Indian and Western scholars in their expositions of Buddhist and Hinduistic philosophies. The chapter on inference was translated into German long ago by Kunst[26], but not quite so long ago as G, Jha's outdated translation of the whole work in the Gaekwad Oriental Series.[27]

Still, any utilization of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* remains hampered if not read in the perspective of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, where Śāntarakṣita has outlined his own approach to Madhyamaka philosophy, in contrast to the critical intent of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*.

Notes to Introduction

1. We have utilized the Peking edition, with corrections from the Cone, of Madhyamakālaṃkārakārikā (#5284) and vṛtti (#5285) by Śāntarakṣita, v.101, Sa 48b,7-Sa 84b,7; and the Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā (#5286) of Kamalaśīla, Sa 84b,7-Sa 143b,1. For the Cone, the kārikā (T.3884), begin on Sa 52b,6; the vṛtti on Sa 56b,3; and the pañjikā on Sa 83b,6. Hereafter MAl. Verse numbers in the text refer to the MAl.

I can see no reason for mKhas-grub-rje's doubt that the pañjikā is by Kamalaśīla. See F.D. Lessing and A. Wayman, trans., MKhas-grub-rje's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1968), pp. 90-91.

2. Peking ed., v.153, Na 71b,7-Na 86a,7.

3. We have utilized the edition published by Sonam Kazi in the Ngagyur Nyingmay Sungrab series, v.71, as vol.12 of the Collected Writing of 'Jam-mgon 'Ju Mi-pham rgya-mtsho (Gangtok, 1976), ff.1-359, with corrections from an original xylograph copied from the collection of Tarthang Tulku Rinpoche, Berkeley, California. Hereafter UG.

4. See Th. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1965), pp.87-122.

5. Collected Writing of 'Jam-mgon 'Ju Mi-pham rgya-mtsho,

vol.13 (Gangtok, 1975), ff.1-95.

6. ibid. p.6. See below p. 165.

7. See below pp. 162-68.

8. See Yoshiro Imaeda, "Documents Tibétains de Touen-Houang Concernant Le Concile du Tibet," Journal Asiatique, fasc. 1 & 2 (1975), 125-146.

9. ibid. pp.132-3.

10. Rong-zom chos-kyi bzang-po, Selected Writings (gSung thor-bu) (Leh: 'Chi-med Rig-'dzin, 1974), ff.341,3-344,2.

11. MA1, f.89b,4-5.

12. MA1, f.48b,8. The kārikās are translated in Appendix 1.

13. For a recent translation, see Alex Wayman, trans., Calming the Mind and Descerning the Real, by Tsong-kha-pa (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1978), pp.9-14.

14. Mi-pham rgya-mtsho, mKhas-pa'i tshul-la 'jug-pa'i sgo, xylograph, n.p., n.d., f.139a

15. MA1, f.52b,3-8. See also MA1, vv.76-78.

16. MA1, f.89b,4-7

17. UG, f.85,4ff.

18. Cf. MA1, v.2.

19. For the following historical discussion we have relied on Kongtrul's Encyclopedia of Indo-Tibetan Culture, Parts I-III, ed. Lokesh Chandra (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1970), I, 445-458; and George N. Roerich, trans., The Blue Annals (Delhi: Motilal Bonarsidass, 1976).

20. Ever since Tsong-kha-pa's definitive exposition of the dGe-lugs-pa position, there has been a lively debate in Tibet on the proper interpretation of the Prāsangika position, with, for example, Go-rams-pa bsod-nams senge contributing a critique from the Sa-skya-pa, Karma-pa Mi-bskyod rdo-rje from the bKa'-brgyud-pa, and Mi-pham rgya-mtsho from the rNyingma-pa. See below pp. 103-106.

21. Masamichi Ichigo, "A Synopsis of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita," J. of Indian and Buddhist Studies, XX, No.2 (Mar. 1972), 989-995. Yuichi Kajiyama, "Later Mādhymikas on Epistemology and Meditation," in Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation, ed. Minoru Kiyota (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1978), pp.114-143. Dr. Ichigo has prepared a critical edition of the MAl, as well as a Japanese translation, which have not yet appeared in print.

22. See below p. 27.

23. Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita's teacher, is the author of the important Satyadvayavibhāgakārikā and vṛtti, to which Śāntarakṣita has written a pañjikā. The Peking edition only has the pañjikā of Śāntarakṣita (#5283). The Tohoku numbers for the kārikā and vṛtti are 3881,3882.

24. Yuichi Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa (1. Kapitel)," Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud- und Ostasiens, 7(1963), 37-62 and 8(1964), 100-130; "Bhāvaviveka and the Prāsangika School," in The Nava-Nālanda-Mahāvihara Research Publication, vol.1, 1957; Shotaro Iida, "The Nature

of Saṃvṛti and the Relationship of Paramārtha to it in Svātantrika-Mādhyamika," in The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta, ed. M.V. Sprung (Dordrecht: Reidel Pub., 1973), pp.64-77; Malcolm Eckel, "Bhāvaviveka and early Mādhyamika theories of language," Philosophy East and West, 28, No.3 (1978), 323-337.

25. See above note 4. Wayman's partial translation of the Lam-rim chen-mo includes Tsong-kha-pa's extensive exegesis of Candrakīrti's arguments (see note 13 above).

26. Probleme Der Buddhistischen Logik in Der Darstellung Des Tattvasaṃgraha, Mémoires de la Commission Orientaliste, No.33 (Krakow: Polish Academy of Sciences, 1939).

27. The Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita, with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla, 2 Vols. (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1937).

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I: THE METHOD OF NO METHOD: WHAT IS IT TO UNDERSTAND?

Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics are not an attempt to provide a methodology of interpretation. Rather, they are an attempt to describe, to make explicit, the nature of understanding as such, to articulate the understanding which preceeds and makes possible any method. Nevertheless, they are of great importance to the practice of interpretation of texts, as David C. Hoy has recently demonstrated in his The Critical Circle, in regard to literary works.[1] In this chapter we shall make some preliminary remarks in this regard concerning the study and translation of Buddhist texts.

A method insures a field of knowledge as an object of study, But in dealing with philosophical, religious, and literary texts, as Hoy points out, it is quite clear that there is a difference between the question, "Do you know the text?" and "Do you understand the text"?[2] Understanding is "something more." But what is this elusive "something more," which is the goal of humanistic study, the maturity which cannot be learned by a method? As mature individuals, we are "claimed" by cultural works which are no longer objects, but partners in a dialogue. Hoy brings out what is of central importance in this "claim":[3]

"Moreover, the claim shows itself in that the artwork

conditions our very understanding of ourselves, our time, and our situation. Thus, the artwork is historical not in being a moment in history, but rather in being a condition for or even a generating force of subsequent cultural achievements."

There is continuing confusion and/or avoidance in Buddhist studies (and in the study of Asian religion-philosophy in general) concerning this conflict between phenomenological-hermeneutical-structural[4] and objectivist-historical-descriptive interpretations of religious and philosophical texts. This is by no means, however, a problem confined to the modern scholar; this tension has been present within the 'traditions' themselves. In regard to Buddhist philosophy, for example, Th. Stcherbatsky, almost fifty years ago, outlined the various 'schools' of commentators on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika in his Buddhist Logic, which he called the "philological," the "philosophical," and the "religious."[5] Although this terminology is inadequate, at least Stcherbatsky saw that there was something more at stake in different interpretations than 'historical developments.' Modern scholars of Asia, for the most part, however, have proceeded in blissful ignorance of hermeneutical problems, in contrast to their colleagues in Hellenic-Semitic studies.

Perhaps it should be remembered that Orientalism itself arose out of a particular conception of hermeneutics in nineteenth century Europe. The 'scientific' study of religion and culture arose as nineteenth century Europe began to look back on its own tradition (e.g., the Bible) as something no longer immedi-

ately understandable or acceptable, that is, in need of 'interpretation' which could be pursued 'scientifically,' as befitted the contemporary situation. Critical scholarship was seen as necessary to avoid misunderstandings due to historical developments lying between the interpreter and the text, such as changes in word meaning. In this conception of interpretation, scholarship became an attempt to reproduce the 'original' historical situation and the intent of the author through critical historical-philological methods and a thorough 'suspension' of the scholar's own 'subjectivity.' One would be foolish to deny the knowledge obtained by these methods. But through this conception of interpretation, i.e., hermeneutics, humanistic study has become a science and history of human culture. The question that must be asked in the face of this development is: to what extent can the 'hermeneutical situation' be purged of 'subjectivity' in the name of 'scientific' methodology?

A translator of H.G. Gadamer, who has been foremost in raising this question, writes, in summary of Gadamer's critique:[6]

> "Historical understanding, according to this theory, is the action of subjectivity purged of all prejudices, and it is achieved in direct proportion to the knower's ability to set aside his own horizons by means of an effective historical method.... <u>What the interpreter negates, then, is his own present as a vital extension of the past</u>.... The role of the past cannot be restricted merely to supplying the texts or events that make up the 'objects' of interpretation. As prejudice and tradition, the past also defines the ground the interpreter himself occupies when he understands. This fact was overlooked, however, by the Neo-Kantians, whose orientation to the sciences presupposed the essentially situationless, non-historical subject of transcendental philosophy. What Gadamer asks us

> to see is that the dominant ideal of knowledge and the alienated, self-sufficient consciousness it involves is itself a powerful prejudice that has controlled philosophy since Descartes. By ignoring the intrinsic temporality of human being it also ignores the temporal character of interpretation. This fate has befallen every hermeneutical theory that regards understanding as a repetition or duplication of a past intention - as a reproductive procedure rather than a genuinely productive one that involves the interpreter's own hermeneutical situation." (emphasis mine)

To put it simply: modern scholarship, while demanding a strict historicity of its objects of interpretation, has stopped short of critical reflection on its own historicity. Here is precisely where the study of modern philosophy becomes essential to the translator dealing with religio-philosophical texts. All the semmingly innocent (worn-out) terminology that is taken for granted in most translations of Buddhist texts, such as 'nature,' 'substance,' 'essence,' 'own-being,' 'being,' 'existence,' 'reality,' 'emptiness,' 'mind,' 'phenomena,' 'body,' 'matter,' 'realism,' 'idealism,' etc., betray precisely this lack of critical reflection on the interpreter's own situation. <u>These terms are themselves historical products of the translator's own tradition</u> (or the tradition within which non-Western scholars working in European languages have chosen to write). The purpose, then, in studying modern (or ancient) philosophy is not to interpret a text in the light of some fashionable contemporary doctrine in search of 'relevance,' or to search out 'parallels' which are then easily labelled spurious by the specialists, for this all presupposes we already know the literal 'core' of the text's meaning and then can busy ourselves

with 'interpretations.'[7] The purpose of such study should be primarily to become aware of the prejudices of our own contemporary subjectivity (rather than merely ignore or try to 'suspend' them), so that we may enter into a new horizon of interpretation which allows a genuine dialogue with the work and the tradition. Historical, philolgical, or structural explanations are not sufficient for entering into this dialogue, for what Paul Ricoeur calls "identifying the discourse within the work," discourse being, "a set of sentences in which somebody says something to somebody else about something."[8] Elsewhere, Ricoeur also states, "To understand a text is to follow its movement from sense to reference, from what it says to what it talks about."[9]

This concern for the subject matter (Sache) of the text is a crucial point stressed by Heidegger and Gadamer in their hermeneutical theories. Once again, Gadamer's translator, David Linge, puts it best:[10]

> "It is precisely in confronting the otherness of the text - in hearing its challenging viewpoint - and not in preliminary methodological self-purgations, that the reader's own prejudices (i.e. his present horizons) are thrown into relief and thus come to critical self-consciousness.... The interpreter must recover and make his own, then, not the personality or the worldview of the author, but the fundamental concern that motivates the text - the question that it seeks to answer and that it poses again and again to its interpreters.... We understand the subject matter of the text when we locate its question; in our attempt to gain this question we are, in our own questioning, continually transcending the historical horizon of the text and fusing it with our own horizon, and consequently transforming our horizon."

In regard to the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, the "subject matters" we shall try to get into view, which remain hidden, as it were, from an objectivist approach which has not sought the *questions* involved because it has not critically reflected on its own horizon in order to meet the horizon of the text, are:

1. What is meant by *sākāra*- and *nirākārajñāna*? Is the problem one of *images* in perception, as Kajiyama, for example,[11] has presented it?

2. What is meant by *Cittamātra*? What is it if it is not an "idealism"? (How can we answer this question unless we know the questions both it and idealisms are asking?)

3. What is the difference between the Svātantrikas and the Prāsangikas? Is it just a technical matter of presentation of arguments according to the canons of Indian logic?

4. What is meant by *svasaṃvedana*? Does it mean "self-consciousness" (consciousness *of* self)?

Certainly these questions demand an historical knowledge of the situatedness of the text. What conception, for example, was the notion of *svasaṃvedana* developed to counter? Out of what earlier Buddhist conceptions did it develop? But exclusive reliance on such an objectivist procedure, designed to insure against the danger of subjectivist, self-fulfilling pre-conceptions which the notion of a hermeneutic circle seems to imply,[12] can only lead to an infinite regress. Will the problem be understood when

it is finally traced back to Śākyamuni or some other 'origin'? One cannot escape the hermeneutical circle, we are asking the question about svasaṃvedana through our standpoint in the ongoing history of tradition. We question the text, but the text also questions us about the subject matter. Here is where the Buddhologist faces a very complex situation, for he or she stands within at least three traditions, consciously or not: the Buddhist tradition's understanding of itself, the general Western philosophic and religious tradition which his or her language is part of, and the specific tradition of Western scholarship on Buddhism.

Two points should be noted here in regard to the hermeneutic situation. First, not only can one not escape into objectivism, but there is also no escape into some intuitive, 'direct' understanding of the text, 'the true, authentic teaching.' There is, however, genuine transmission of tradition, the on-going task of interpretation performed anew by those "claimed" by the questions of the tradition. Second, this conception of hermeneutics outlined here cuts across the "edic-emic" distinction. Both those 'within' and 'without' a tradition must deal with the prejudices of their own horizons if they are to 'meet' that of the text and maintain the vitality of the tradition, if its message is to be more than an old garb for contemporary prejudices.

Of course, there can be many reasons for interest in

a text. Not all wish to be "claimed" by the questions of the text, but seek historical, social, or linguistic data. It is not the place here to discuss the hermeneutical problems of the various fields of historical knowledge, but what we do wish to point out is that the mere choice of a text to work on singles it out as 'worthy', as 'canonical' for one's study.[13] For example, the most careful, meticulous scholar in one school or period of Buddhist philosophy cannot study other (relevant) schools or periods as carefully, yet he must in the course of his or her work say something about other periods and schools. How does such a scholar mediate between the conflicting claims that are made by the tradition? Perhaps he or she discovers that one school misrepresents another. Does this solve the problem, invalidate the claims, destroy the possibility of mediation? Singling out is already interpretation, an implicit bestowing of value, of 'trust' in the meaningfulness of the text. The scholar must be clear about his or her own interests if one's prejudices are not to overevaluate one's own subject matter and/or underevaluate others, no matter how fine one's area of concentration may be.

This problem is particularly important to us regarding the Mādhyamika critiques of the Yogācāra. It is clear that the later Indian and Tibetan Mādhyamikas for the most part levelled their attacks on later developments among the Yogācāras, i.e., the Yogācāra-pramāṇavāda fusion of Dignāga

and Dharmakīrti. Does this then exempt Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and Sthiramati from their critiques? To approach this problem we have proceeded along the lines outlined in this chapter, i.e., by trying to think the matter of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra approaches to experience through a reflection on contemporary phenomenology.[14]

Basic to this 'method' is that not only is understanding already interpretation, but it is already application.[15] Certainly we are engaging in interpretation and application of knowledge, but this is not like applying natural scientific knowledge to technical research. In this sense, knowledge is more the outcome of interpretation and application than something secured in advance. It is a matter of responding adequately to the hermeneutical situation, the subject matter brought out in one's conversation with the text. As Merleau-Ponty said regarding the history of philosophy:[16]

> "It is a question here not of an empirical history, which limits itself to the gathering of facts on the one hand and texts on the other, but rather of an 'intentional history,' as Husserl called it, which in a given assemblage of texts and works tries to discover their legitimate sense.... The history of philosophy can never be the simple transcription of what the philosophers have said or written.... As a matter of fact, as soon as one approaches two texts and opposes them to a third, one begins to interpret and to distinguish what is really proper to the thought of Descartes, let us say, and, on the contrary, what is only accidental. Thus in Cartesianism, as it is defined by the texts, we begin to see an intention that the historian has taken the initiative in singling out, and this choice evidently depends on his own way of encountering the problems of philosophy. The history of philosophy cannot be separated from philosophy. There is, of course, a difference between reflection on texts and the purely arbitrary."

Notes to Chapter I

1. David C.Hoy, The Critical Circle (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978).

2. Hoy, p.48.

3. Hoy, p.47.

4. Paul Ricoeur is an example of a thinker trying to bring together the phenomenological, hermeneutical, and structuralist trends. See esp. his Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in hermeneutics, ed. Don Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1974).

5. Th.Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, vol.1 (New York: Dover Publications, 1962), pp.39-47.

6. David Linge, trans., Philosophical Hermeneutics, by Hans-Georg Gadamer (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976), pp.xiv,xv.

7. For an excellent critique of the 'letter vs. spirit' dichotomy in the history of translation, see George Steiner, After Babel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 251-78.

8. Paul Ricoeur, "Philosophical hermeneutics and theological hermeneutics," Sciences Religieuses, 5, no.1 (Summer 1975/6), p.22

9. Paul Ricoeur, "Human Science and Hermeneutical Method," in David Carr and Edward Casey, eds., Explorations in Phenomenology (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), p.42

10. Linge, trans., p.xxi.

11. See Yuichi Kajiyama, trans., An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy, Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, No.10 (Kyoto: Kyoto University, 1966); "Controversy between the sākāra- and nirākāra-vādins of the yogācāra school - some materials," Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 14, no.1 (Dec. 1965), 418-429; and his article cited in note 21, Introduction.

12. See Christopher E.Arthur, "Gadamer and Hirsch: The Canonical Work and the Interpreter's Intention," Cultural Hermeneutics, 4, 183-196 for a good summary of the problem.

13. Here enters the notorious problem of over- and under-evaluation of texts. See Steiner, pp.296ff.

14. See below chap.III.

15. See Hoy, pp.51-55.

16. M. Merleau-Ponty, "Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man," in J. O'Neill, ed., Phenomenology, Language, and Sociology (London: Heinemann, 1974), pp.229,230.

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II: MAJOR ISSUES OF THE MADHYAMAKĀLAṂKĀRA: ARTHAKRIYĀKĀRITVA AND SVASAṂVEDANA

As mentioned in the Introduction, there are five major issues discussed in the Madhyamakālaṃkāra according to Mi-pham rgya-mtsho. He states:

"In this treatise there are five special positions in its approach which are superior to other Mādhyamika (presentations). They are:

1. The restriction ('jog-pa) that only particular existents which are efficacious (don-byed nus-pa) are the ultimate object of valid means of knowledge;
2. The special claim that the noetic (shes-pa), and not objects, is reflexively cognitive and illuminating (rang-rig rang-gsal);
3. The claim, as in the Cittamātra, in which the variety of presences as an object-in-itself (phyi-don) is present by virtue of one's own experience (sems);
4. The division of the ultimate into two: discursive and non-discursive (rnam-grangs, rnam-grangs-min);
5. The understanding that there is no contradiction regarding the object of each valid means of knowledge in the situation of setting forth the discursively-formulated ultimate (i.e., that there

is necessarily no contention between the assertions of each of the two truths)."[1]

In this chapter we shall consider the first two issues, which concern the key accomplishments of the so-called Buddhist Logicians, i.e., those who dealt with the question of the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa, tshad-ma). As is well-known, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti distinguished the two truths according to the criterion of efficacy;[2] the ultimately real was the efficacious svalakṣaṇa (rang gi mtshan-nyid), which is not a "mathematical point-instant," as Stcherbatsky claimed,[3] but the unique object of knowledge by direct acquaintance (pratyakṣa, mngon-sum), having its own place, time, and characteristic (deśa, kala, ākāra; yul, dus, rnam-pa).[4]

Stcherbatsky's Kantian bias is important here, for with the Kantian split between the understanding as pure activity and sensuous intuition as pure passivity (mediated by the schematizing activity of the imagination), the object of sensuous intuition becomes a meaningless hyle requiring a higher-order bestowing of meaning. Edmund Husserl, although rejecting his own earlier conception of a sensuous hyle,[5] could never really free himself from this Kantian dualism in his doctrine of "empty" intentions and their sensuous "fulfillments."[6] It was the great merit of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception to have broke with this aspect of Husserlian intentionality in his

dialectic critique of what he termed "Intellectualism" (the Kantian tradition) and "Empiricism" (British empiricism and its modern psychological counterparts, who it should be noted, continue to the present day in Cognitive Psychology[7]). For Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenon of perception is a pre-objective gestalt (configuration), a being-in an intrinsically meaningful (i.e., not in need of a bestowing of meanings by an intending consciousness, or through memory-association) perceptual field. We shall see how the Sautrāntika and Cittamātra theories of perception relate to these modern developments, which are of particular importance because most translators of Buddhist philosophies, ignorant of these developments, unwittingly employ the language of British empiricism in their translations.

The conventional truth for the Buddhist logicians is the object of judgment and inference (anumāna, rjes-dpag), which is a universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa, spyi'i mtshan-nyid). These are abstractions (abhāva, dngos-med), which have their origin in negation according to the famous theory of exclusion (apoha or anyāpoha, sel-ba or gzhan-sel), and can only indirectly refer to the unique svalakṣaṇa. This, however, does not entail an ontological dualism; pratyakṣa and anumāna are different means for exploring one reality, for while the directly-apprehended object (grahyaviṣaya, gzung-yul) of pratyakṣa is the svalakṣaṇa, this phase of

perception gives rise to perceptual judgments as its indirect object (adhyavasāyaviṣaya, lhag-par zhen-pa'i yul). Similarly, the direct object of anumāna is the sāmānya, while its indirect object is the svalakṣaṇa.[8] Through this approach the Buddhist epistemologist is able to avoid the intellectualist-empiricist split regarding perception. The svalakṣaṇa is an ontological plenum, its essential existence (svabhāva, rang-bzhin, rang-gi ngo-bo) is apprehended as it is by perception;[9] judgments can only abstract from it in terms of general characteristics through exclusion of other characteristics. This exclusion is based on pragmatic concerns, i.e. in order to remove doubt or error concerning direct perception.[10] Thus, for example, the relation of whole and part, or universal and particular, are constituted through judgments based on the principle of exclusion, and are not particular existents themselves, cognized through perception. As such, they are not pure fictions, like a hare's horn, but can only indirectly refer to the svalakṣaṇa.

It should be remembered here that when Dignāga and Dharmakīrti assert that the svalakṣaṇa belongs to the ultimate truth, this is because their inquiry is a tha-snyad dpyod-pa'i tshad-ma, a logical inquiry through valid means of knowledge established conventionally.[11] The Madhyamaka, on the other hand, employs a don-dam dpyod-pa'i tshad-ma, an inquiry on the ultimate level. We shall see below how

Mi-pham is eager to show the non-contradictoriness of the two (Chapter IV).

Mi-pham presents issue one as follows:

"1. Although the genuine conventional object of valid knowledge (gzhal-byå, prameya) is efficacious, the aspect (cha) of abstraction (dngos-med) is founded on particular existents in that it is unable to appear under its own power. Since it is known to be an ascription by the intellect through exclusion of what is other (gzhan-sel, anyāpoha), one can accept that which is established by naive perception, and by this set forth the whole of the knowable which is present as an object of naive perception, as impermanent. Thus, although it is merely boasted that space, etc. are eternal, when these are established as a mere ascription as an abstraction, then when something is a particular existent it must be efficacious. If it is (such), then since it is found to be momentary, all particular existents are quickly established as impermanent. If one knows how to identify substantial (rdzas) and postulated (btags) objects by means of presence and exclusion (snang sel), there arises a deep understanding of that which is like the eye and heart of the basic texts of logic. The claim that efficacy, which divides the conventional into the division of the genuine

and non-genuine (-ly real), exists in an ultimate sense, is similar to that of the Sautrāntikas, and even Dharmakīrti is known to have said: 'If I go into an examination of an independently-existing (object), I rely on the support of the Sautrāntikas.'[12] Here (in the Madhyamakālaṃkāra), although an unobserved, public object is not accepted, it is necessary to make a conventional method of validation concerning the ontic mode of presencing (snang-tshul), which appears as a variety of presences by virtue of experience (sems)."[13]

The principal verses of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra relating to this first issue of efficacy are vv. 64-66, which come just after Śāntarakṣita has established his thesis that all particular existents are neither unitary nor multiple. An objection is raised:

"Then is the actuality of the conventional an abstraction (dngos-med)? If it were, then wouldn't it contradict efficacy which is observed and believed in? This is demonstrated not to be so (as follows):

The thematized entities (chos-can) which arise and cease (momentarily) and are enjoyed merely by virtue of not investigating them,
Are that which is efficacious. Understand that that (this) is the conventional.//64

The relative-conventional is not a mere conventional

expression. Since the particular existents which are observed and believed in and which come about contextually, cannot withstand a critique, (they are) the genuinely relative. When one makes a conventional expression in this way, which is called an 'ascription', etc., why should this contradict efficacy? As it is said:

> 'That which comes about contextually is called
> openness;
> This is a founded designation. This itself
> is the Middle Way.'"[15]

Kamalaśīla adds:

> "Since particular existents which come about contextually are ultimately without essential existence, therefore, they are really like a hare's horn and are thus called 'empty.' (This is) not so. Therefore, there is no contradiction with what is seen, etc. 'This is a founded designation,' refers to the conventional. The terms 'designation' (gdags-pa) and 'founded' (rgyur byas-pa) are synonymous with the relative. This is their origin. 'This itself is the Middle Way' is spoken of since the two extremes of positive and negative imputations have been eliminated."[16]

Śāntarakṣita continues on the same theme in the next two verses:

"Although (these entities) are enjoyed merely by
virtue of not investigating them,
There arises a similar subsequent result based on
its previous causes.//65
Therefore, if the conventional is without a (real)
causal basis, then, says (the reductionist, its
presence) is not possible. This is not so.
If the founding basis is real, then say so (with
reason).//66

This has already been explained. Entitative existence which is efficacious while not withstanding a critique, is known as the 'genuine conventional.' Mere sounds, such as 'person,' etc., are not. If (something) comes about based on its own cause which cannot withstand a critique according to this approach, how could it be without a cause? If its cause existed when investigated by intrinsic awareness and discernment, intelligent people would say so. 'Even a cart does not pass beyond this reality,' has been explained as applying to everything (i.e., it is a founded designation)."[17]

The other major contribution of the Buddhist logicians was their _definition_ of the mental as _svasaṃvedana_ (_rang-rig_), non-referential, reflexive awareness. The _sva_ of _svasaṃvedana_, the _rang_ of _rang-rig_ do not mean here that consciousness is aware _of_ itself, but that, as Śāntirakṣita tells us, this awareness does not depend on another to be aware (_gzhan_

la mi-ltos-pa),[18] that is, cognitiveness is not a causal result. In criticizing the view (of the Vaibhāṣikas) that the noetic is itself non-intentional, like a clear crystal, and substantially distinct from its object, Śāntarakṣita makes not only reflexivity (non-referentiality) characteristic of the noetic, but also intentionality, i.e., the noetic "possesses" a noema (sākāra, rnam-bcas-pa). Thus, direct realism and its counterpart of a wholly referential awarenesss is shattered.

Following Dignāga and Dharmakīrti,[19] one can only reflectively ascribe "presence to itself" (rang-gi snang, svābhasa) to svasaṃvedana, which makes possible such reflective activity. To take svasaṃvedana as "consciousness of itself" is to make it referential. Ultimately, it is a partless whole, a total situation, although reflectively we may analyze the cognitive situation into the producer and the produced, or the means of knowledge (pramāṇa, tshad-ma), object of knowledge (prameya, gzhal-bya), and result of knowledge (pramāṇa-phala, tshad-ma'i 'bras-bu). But, as Dignāga informs us,[20] the result of the activity of knowing is not different from the means of knowledge, and may be referred to as svasaṃvedana or sākārajñāna. Another important area where Dignāga applies these insights into the non-referential and intentional nature of the noetic, is the problem of memory. He shows[21] that in the wholly referentialist view of the nirākārajñāna (non-inten-

tionality) view of the Vaibhāṣika and the Hindu realists, one couldn't even have a subsequent knowledge of one's cognition, and begins to develop a theory of retentions, anticipating Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness in this respect.

In verses 16-21 of the MAl Śāntarakṣita establishes svasaṃvedana and sākārajñāna. But being a Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, this is only part of a dialectical procedure. The sākāra (intentionality) is certainly superior to the nirākāra (non-intentionality), but Śāntarakṣita then turns (in verses 22-33) to a critique of the different theories of sākāra among the Sautrāntikas. First we shall present Mi-pham's summary of this second major issue of the text:

> "2. Non-referential (reflexive) awareness exists only conventionally; in its essential existence (rang-gi ngo-bo) it is not a referential awareness (yul-rig) which is divided into a noesis (rig-byed) and a noema (rig-bya). By demonstrating the position which accepts non-referential awareness conventionally in its meaning that experience merely comes about as cognitive and illumining, which excludes it from the insentient, non-referential awareness conventionally is non-contradictorily established without engaging in any of the clamor about the contradiction of something acting on itself, etc. By this, presence has been established as experience

(<u>sems</u>), and the conventionality of the experience of objects is non-contradictorily established. If one has affirmed this, since the experience of an object-in-itself, etc., is not established because there is no relation (between the sentient and the insentient), one has destroyed all claims of naive perception (<u>tshur-mthong</u>). Therefore, non-referential awareness is the single, essential point of all conventional logical inquiry."[22]

Śāntarakṣita states as follows:

"Now we shall concretely demonstrate the dualist and and non-dualist methods of explanation by our own schools and others.[23] The approach of the dualists is to claim that, while the duality of the apprehending and the apprehendable genuinely exists, perception is like a clear crystal and cannot be said to grasp a noema of an (intended) object. We shall make an examination of these (claims).

Perception comes about (characteristically) contrary to that which is insentient.
That which is essentially not insentient is the reflexivity of the noetic.//16

The position in which perception is without an (intended) noema (according to) the approach of the dualists (involves the following): since understanding is only (to be found) in cognitiveness and in

oneself, and since perception doesn't encounter the presence of an object, the very being (bdag-nyid) of experience of an object which is separate from oneself would be impossible. The positing of this (experiencing) as non-referential awareness (is done) because its very being is naturally illumining, and is the contrary of that which is without awareness, such as a cart. This is its essential existence in being cognitive. Since (this) cognizing, in the case of something blue, doesn't depend upon another, this is the meaning of 'is not insentient.' This is called 'non-referential awareness.'

> Since one cannot accept that that which is partless and unitary is three-fold,
> The reflexivity of this (noesis) is not itself a particular existent which is divided into an agent and an object of activity.//17

As it is said, the ability to set up an object's respective noema is the cause (of perception). This is what is to be cognized, and perception which ascertains the factuality of the object is what is to be produced. Non-referential awareness, which is spoken of as the 'cognizer' according to the approach in which a noesis possesses a perceptual noema, cannot thus be accepted, since from a perception which in its very being is partless, a tri-partite division into

activity of cognition, cognizer, and what is to be cognized; or activity of production, producer, and what is to be produced, is not tenable.

Since, when one has turned away from what has previously originated, it is non-existent, it is without ability (to set up a perception); yet when it is able, its factuality which is claimed to be the producer (of the perception), is also completely established as what is claimed to be produced (by the perception) which is not different from it it. Thus, activity in its very being is contradicted. Therefore, the activity of illumining, whose very being is intrinsically illuminating without being dependent on another, is called 'the non-referentiality of perception.'

> Therefore, because this is the essential existence
> of the noetic, it is the very being of the
> noetic.
> How can that which is other (than the noetic) which
> has the essential existence of an object, become
> known by this (partless) noesis (since there
> would be no relation between them)?//18

For example, since its very fact of being is illumining, one claims it as illuminating in regard to its essentially illuminating function. In the same way, perception also, since its very being is experience, is

claimed as non-referential (reflexive) awareness. Since perception is characterized by cognition of individual objects, this is also its essential existence (ngo-bo nyid) of determining (yongs-su dpyod-pa) the object[24]. If one claims, therefore, that just as (perception experiences) itself, it also experiences the object, this is not correct.

> If the essential existence of this (noesis) does
> not exist in what is other (i.e., objects), how
> could this (noesis) know another (object in the
> same way it is reflexively) noetic,
> Since it is claimed (by you) that the knower and
> the known are separate entities.//19

The fact known as 'determination' is specific to the noetic; since it is like the pleasurableness of pleasure, etc., how could this be a similarity to what is other? (One may think:) by virtue of a relation (between the noetic and its object) one will experience 'this which is so-and-so.' But the mere coming about from something does not establish experience of the object, since that would lead to the consequence that the eye, etc.,(would also be experienced).[25]

If the object were to become essentially determination, and if perception is also essentially this, then since the object of the noetic is in fact determination, there would be no difference (between the

two) in the very fact of experience.

If the noetic is also to be referential (don-rig), in the approach of those whose thinking has been vitiated by the poison of obsession with an object in-itself, this is impossible, since (according to this approach) the object and the noetic are two different things. When (we investigate) the view of those who claim that there is no non-referential (reflexive) awareness of the noesis and the noema, (we find) that there would be no awareness of the two, and 'the object' and 'the noetic' would not be established. If the noetic is (intrinsically) illumining, then (this) illumination cannot become illumining. (Otherwise) since (this) illumination is not (intrinsically) illumining, then, just as in the case of an object which is claimed as a direct acquaintance of another person, even an object claimed (to be directly experienced by oneself) would not be directly experienced, since there would be no reason for the relation (of noesis and object).

Moreover, this position in which the noesis is without a noema is shown to be very inferior to the position in which the noesis possesses a noema, since there is no relation (of noesis and object in the former).

In the case of those who say that the noesis possesses a noema although these two are really

separate,

Since (the intended object and the noema) are like (an object and its) mirror-image, (the intended object) is merely postulated as a felt experience.//20

The reflection which is the very being of the noetic set forth by this (position, i.e., sākārajñānavāda), this very awareness is referential (don-shes). On account of this, the experience of the reflection as resulting from the object, is labelled 'experience of the object.'[26]

In the case of those who do not claim perception to be 'colored' by the noema of the (intended) object,

There wouldn't even exist the (noetic) aspect which cognizes the (intended) object.//21

Because it is essentially insentient, a particular existent which is the object of awareness is far from being the object (of perception). Since (the nirākāra-jñānavāda) don't even accept a reflection as the cause of relation (between noesis and object), even postulation (of an object) is impossible. If this is so, then (the theory in which) a noesis possesses a noema is correct. But, this is not so."[27]

As mentioned above, the establishment of svasaṃvedana (non-referential, reflexive awareness) is also the establishment of sākārajñāna (the intentionality of conscious-

ness), which Śāntarakṣita has just demonstrated. The result is a kind of phenomenalism, as H.V. Guenther has brought out by employing the terminology of C.D. Broad's Sensum Theory in translating texts on the Sautrāntika theory of perception.[28]. That is, the Sautrāntikas, having freed themselves from direct realism, are still caught up in the problem of the 'real' relation between the objective constituent or sensum, and the epistemological-cum-ontological (i.e., physical) object which is said to "deliver up" (gtad-pa) the sensum as the "emitting region." Phenomenology and the Yogācāra Buddhists understand that this is not a 'real', physical relation, and even the Sautrāntikas admit that an ontological object can only be inferred, like the real object in the case of a mirror-reflection.[29] For Husserl, this relation is a problem of constitution. Sākāra-jñāna indicates that, from the start, we deal with meanings in experience, and not mere stimuli that must be filtered and/or associated to become meaningful. Husserl has said: "The noema is nothing but a generalization of the notion of meaning to the total realm of acts."[30] The noema is the intended-as-such, the judged-as-such, the perceived-as-such, as distinguished from what is judged about, etc., i.e., the intentional object:[31]

> "For Husserl, then, the perceptual noema, like the intentional essence of a perceptual act, is a meaning by virtue of which we refer to perceptual objects."

Husserl continued with this conception, although fraught

with ambiguities, right through to his last work, _The Crisis of European Sciences_, where he states:[32]

> "But everywhere he (the psychologist) finds not only intentions but also, contained in them as correlates, the 'intentional objects' — in an essential and completely peculiar way of 'being contained.' They are not integral (_reelle_) parts of the intention but are something meant in it, its particular meaning,..."

Husserl elucidates somewhat the "peculiar way" the intentional object is "contained" in the intention in the following passage:[33]

> "...we pursue the synthesis through which the manifold appearances bear within themselves 'that which is' as their 'object pole.' The latter is in the appearances not as a component part (_reell_) but intentionally, as that _of which_ each, in its own way, is an appearance. In terms of intentionality, anything straightforwardly experienced as a 'this-here', as a thing, is an index of its manners of appearing,..."

Finally, like the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras, Husserl also states:[34]

> "'The' thing itself is actually that which no one experiences as really seen, since it is always in motion, always, and for everyone, a unity for consciousness of the openly endless multiplicity of changing experiences and experienced things, one's own and those of others."

That the perceptual object can be for Husserl a "unity for consciousness" rests on this ambiguous notion of the noema. _Is there_ an "intended-as-such" or a "perceived-as-such" through which we can refer, or which we may want to identify with the object-as-intended or referred-to, as Aron Gurwitsch attempted to do in his phenomenology of perception?[35] What is given and what is taken in perception? H. Dreyfus has shown that Gurwitsch, in his uneasiness with

Husserl's emphasis on what is taken in perception, has gone to the other extreme of emphasizing what is given, in interpreting the noema as a perceptual gestalt.[36] But the ambiguity of the Husserlian noema cannot be solved, but only dissolved, as we shall see in the Mādhyamika analysis. As Merleau-Ponty has shown, the perceived-as-such is inherently ambiguous; it is both present and absent. The structure of objectivity which is constituted by the Husserlian duality of noema and ideal intentional object, is such for the timeless Transcendental Ego. But temporality shatters this absolute objectivity: "The ideal of objective thought is both based on and ruined by temporality."[37] Husserl brilliantly saw this first aspect of temporality, but not the second (ruination). The openness of things is not that they are a limitless series of perspectives, but the fact that they cannot be reduced, in their 'transcendence', even to such an open, 'variational' essence. As Merleau-Ponty states:[38]

> "The thing and the world exist only in so far as they are experienced by me or by subjects like me, since they are both the concatenation of our perspectives, yet they transcend all perspectives because this chain is temporal and incomplete."

We shall return to this central problem when we discuss the Yogācāra, who are quite similar to the Sautrāntikas, except that they can dispense with the notion of an independently existing object which is responsible for "transmitting" a perceptual noema. But they do not escape the problem of

the noema, and Śāntarakṣita will explicitly refer to the following arguments against the Sautrāntikas when critiquing the Cittamātra.[39]

Śāntarakṣita now continues with a critique of the notion of the noema among the Sautrāntikas, the first of their theories being known as the "non-duality of the multiple."[40] According to Mi-pham, this theory holds that the object 'has' many perceptual noemata, but only gives rise to a single noesis, e.g., blue, or that a variegated object transmits many noemata but there is only a single visual perception of variegatedness, i.e., there are many noemata but a single noesis. Hence the name, "non-duality of the multiple."[41] Śāntarakṣita continues:

"In regard to this (i.e., sākāra),

> Since there is no difference between the unitary
> noesis (and its noema, according to this view),
> there wouldn't be a multiplicity of perceptual
> noemata.
>
> Therefore, one couldn't posit that there would be
> noeses (intending) intended objects by virtue
> of this multiplicity.//22

The perception which views a painting, etc., comes about undoubtedly with as many specific perceptual noemata as there are specific regions of blue, gold, etc. If this is so, the noetic would not be in harmony with this. This variety of perceptual noemata is logically unten-

able, since they would not be separate from the unitary perception, being the very factuality of the noesis. Therefore, in this case one couldn't establish a variety of perceptual noemata as the cause of the awareness of a variety of intended objects, such as 'this is blue, this is gold.'

Now, one may maintain that one can certainly claim that there exists a variety of perceptual noemata which are clearly perceived. If this is so,

> Since perception would not be differentiable from
> the perceptual noemata (according to you, then
> since noemata are multiple, the noesis) would no
> longer be a unity.
> If this is not so, how could these two (noesis and
> noema) be called a 'unity.'//23

If perception is 'bodily' not different from the many perceptual noemata, then it would be as multiple as these various perceptual noemata. If, while perception is in actuality only unitary, perceptual noemata are multiple, then since there is a contradiction, the non-difference of perceptual noema and perception is contradictory. One may claim (the following):[42]

> The noeses (intending) white, etc., come about
> gradually (in perceiving a multi-colored
> object),
> But since they come about in quick succession,

stupid people think of them as perceived
simultaneously.//24

One says: in the case of piercing a hundred petals of a lotus flower, since this occurs very quickly although it is really gradual, it (appears to happen) all at once, just as in seeing a whirling fire-brand. This seeing is spoken of on account of its quick whirling. If this is so, then

Since the intellectual apprehensions of the sound
la-tā, etc., come about in quick succession,
Even in this case, (apprehensions) should come
about simultaneously: why doesn't it happen
like this?//25

(In this case,) even the intellect (which apprehends) the objects which are the letters 'la-tā, ta-la, sa-ra ra-sa,' etc., would similarly arise in quick succession, and therefore, because of this arising in quick succession, as in the (example) of the painting, etc., why doesn't one apprehend them (i.e., the letters) simultaneously? A result similar to its cause, which yet is different, is untenable since it would not be a cause.[43]

Even purely intellectual apprehensions could't be
known to come about in succession (in this case).
Since they do not remain for any length of time,
all of these apprehensions would be indistin-

guishable in their rapid succession.//26

Since, at the time of attending to, discursively examining, etc., visual perception, etc., which are of a different type (of mental activity) can arise uninterruptedly and without being confused (with other types of acts), why, since these (acts) clearly arise in rapid succession, are they not apprehended all at once? In this first case, 'since they arise rapidly on account of this,' is not an adequate reply. Even according to the opponent, the mental activities which pass away very quickly, are said, 'not to remain for any length of time.'

Therefore, in regard to all the objects (of apprehension), although they wouldn't be gradually apprehended,
The seeming variety of perceptual noemata would appear as apprehended simultaneously.//27

Therefore, since there would be no differentiation of rapid succession, just as in the case of the differentiation of noemata apprehended regarding all objects, it would be difficult to counter (the objection) that there would be no gradual (succession). Dissimilar results which are similar to all (their) causes are untenable, and would just not be causes, as explained before. The example of seeing the whirling fire-brand is thus not correct.

Also, in the case of the whirling fire-brand, (although) there arises the error of it appearing simultaneously

as a circle,

Since, when seen, it is present quite clearly, there are no intervals (of earlier and later moments to be connected) by sight.//28

Would not that which is clearly present contradict intervals?

That is, the connecting of intervals would be done by memory-retention and not vision,

Since the latter cannot apprehend a past object.//29

Memory-retention would connect that which is made into an object, since what hasn't been apprehended would not be able to be connected.

What then follows from this?

That which is the object of this (memory-retention) would not be clearly (perceived) since it is past.

For this reason, this presence as a circle (in the case of the whirling fire-brand) would not be clearly (perceived).//30

Memory doesn't (provide) a very clear apprehension, as in the case of an entity directly before one, and seeing a circle of fire which is of this nature (i.e., connected by memory) is just like this (i.e., not clear); but the clear presence as a circle of fire is apparent. The noesis which (sees) the piercing of a hundred lotus petals all at once, moreover, is not clearly apparent. If one thinks that the piercing

is all at once, then since there is a logical contradiction, it is logical that it is not simultaneous. Those possessed of the eye of discernment which is very finely focused, determine it as gradual. That which pierces many (things) by a single action is a gradual (process), like a copper-plate, etc. Also this piercing many lotus petals by a single action of a person, is inferred. Suitable (i.e., of the same type) noeses equal in number to their noemata come about together in (seeing) the surface of a painting, (it is said).[44] We shall demonstrate the approach of those who think that different types of noeses of form, sound, etc., are like this.

At the time of seeing a single painting, we (call
it a) whole,
In claiming that many intentions corresponding to
their (objects) come about together.//31

Then,

If this is so, although a noesis (intends) a single
perceptual noema of white, etc,
Since (the perceptual noema) has various (parts)
such as upper, middle, and edge, it would become
various possible objects.//32

In the same way as many perceptual noemata such as blue, white, etc., even a (single perceptual noema of) white, etc. which is claimed as unitary, would

be many perceptual noemata of upper, near, and far sides. Further, the noetic itself (corresponding) to this would become multiple. If one claims (the noema) would be multiple, (the opponent claims) they would be unitary, and one could apprehend a partless atom as an object. The division into parts of this object (i.e., the atomistic white, etc.) is not able to be determined even by those of very acute discernment. (Now,) the statement that this view also is not experienced:

An atomistic white, etc., that is partless and unitary:
A noesis for which this is present is not experienced by oneself.//33"[45]

Let us try to sum up the critique of the Sautrāntikas. The Sautrāntikas, while recognizing that the 'transcendent' object is never directly experienced, in critiquing wholly referential awareness (nirākāra) and recognizing that awareness is not a causal product which depends upon another to be "illuminated" (svasaṃvedana), encounter in their sākāra-perception doctrine similar problems to those of the Husserlian doctrine of intentionality. As Husserl saw, only the act is immanent, the meanings (noema) it deals with are not. Unfortunately, the ideality of the Husserlian noema creates problems for a phenomenology of perception. Are these noemata the means whereby we are directed towards objects, or the objects them-

selves _as_ perceived? The Sautrāntikas realized that the means of knowledge (_pramāṇa_) can only be conceptually distinguished from the result of knowledge (_pramāṇa-phala_), the means being the _ākāra_. Thus, they got into the same kinds of problems Gurwitsch faced in trying to identify the Husserlian noema (as means) with a perceptual noema. Both are unable to deal essentially with the difference between perception and imagination.[46] The Sautrāntikas appeal to an 'external object' as an object of knowledge (_prameya_) which is different from the means of knowledge; yet it is somehow 'similar' (_'dra-ba_, _sārūpya_) to the perceptual noema, although not directly experienced. The phenomena of perception has been missed, as Merleau-Ponty would say. Consider this statement by Gurwitsch about the perceptual noema:[47]

> "When an object is perceived, there is, on the one hand, the act with its elements, whatever they may be: the act as a real event in psychical life, happening at a certain moment of phenomenal time, appearing, lasting, disappearing, and when it has disappeared, never returning. On the other hand, there is what, in this concrete act, stands before the perceiving subject's mind.... What has been described...is the _noema of perception_ - namely, the object just (exactly so and so) as the perceiving subject is aware of it, as he intends it in this concrete experienced mental state."

Is perception experiencing a mental state, or just having something before one's mind? The theory becomes a theory of perceptual judgments and anticipations only.[48]

The fundamental problem here is ontological, as Heidegger and the Madhyamaka Buddhists saw, each in their

own way. Heidegger said in recalling the questioning which led him to the "question of Being" and the writing of <u>Being and Time</u>:[49]

> "Whence and how is it determined what must be experienced as 'the things themselves' in accordance with the principle of phenomenology? Is it consciousness and its objectivity or is it the Being of beings in its unconcealedness and concealment."

A commentator on Heidegger explains:[50]

> "If we take sense and reference as jointly necessary conditions of full meaning, the problem might be stated simply: How are they joined? By arbitrary convention, in the nature of things, or in some other way?.... 'How is this relation between an ideal entity and a real present-at-hand entity to be grasped ontologically?.... the dilemma, Heidegger maintains, may be resolved by understanding truth not as a relation between real and ideal entities - or for that matter between merely ideal entities - but rather as the activity in which entities 'come to light' or are discovered in and by a kind of being not properly understood as a substantial entity."

Notes to Chapter II

1. UG, f.51,2-4

2. See Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā, ed. Yusho Miyasaka, in Acta Indologica, II (1971/2), chap. III, vv.1,3. (We shall use the standard numbering of the chapters, in which the pratyakṣapariccheda is the third.) Hereafter PV.

3. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, I, pp.106ff.

4. See Kajiyama, An Introduction, p.56

5. See Aron Gurwitsch, "Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego: Studies of the Relation between Gestalt Theory and Phenomenology," in his Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp.253-8.

6. See Hubert Dreyfus, "The Perceptual Noema: Gurwitsch's Crucial Contribution," in Lester Embree, ed., Life-World and Consciousness (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 135-170, for a lucid presentation of this problem.

7. For an excellent survey of contemporary Cognitive Psychology, including a critique of the currently popular information-processing models, see Ulrich Neisser, Cognition and Reality (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1976). Merleau-Ponty's critiques in the Phenomenology of Perception of "Intellec-

tualism" and "Empiricism" remain as timely today as when they were written 30 years ago.

8. See Dharmottara's commentary on Nyāyabindu I,12 in Stcherbatsky, II, p.34; and Kajiyama, An Introduction, pp.58-9.

9. See PV I, 43.

10. See PV I,45. H.V. Guenther has brilliantly summed up the apoha theory's resolution of the problem of universals: "the 'horseness' is not of the 'horse' but the horse which is 'horsy' in relation to other things, which then are technically termed chos-can (Skt. dharmin)." ("Tantra and Revelation," in H.V. Guenther, Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective (Emeryville, Calif.: Dharma Press, 1977), p.211 n.).

11. For a clear presentation of the different tshad-ma see mDo-sngags bstan-pa'i nyi-ma, lTa-grub shan-'byed gnad-kyi sgron-me yi tshig-don rnam-bshad 'jam-dbyangs dgongs-brgyan, f.23a,6-29a,1

12. I could not locate this quotation in any of Dharmakīrti's works. It seems to merely be a statement reflecting the fact that Dharmakīrti, following Dignāga, interpreted his theories both according to the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra.

13. UG, f.51,4-52,3

14. For Mi-pham's topical outline (sa-bcad) of the whole MAl, see appendix 2.

15. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, XXIV, 18. This celebrated verse contains the difficult phrase sā prajñaptirupādāya, Madhyamakaśāstra of Nāgārjuna, ed. P.L. Vaidya (Darbhanga:

Mithila Institute, 1960), p.219. The usual Tibetan translation is de-ni brten-nas gdags-pa ste (Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti, trans. Jacques May (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneve, 1959), p.440, who notes also rgyur bcas for brten-nas). Śāntarakṣita (MA1, Sa 68b,5) has: de-ni rgyur-byas gdags-pa ste, while Kamalaśīla (MA1, Sa 121b,3) has: de-ni rgyur-byas ming gdags-pa. May's translation (p.237) and footnote (n.840) are misleading; śūnyatā is not a metaphorical designation for the absolute reality, as May would have it. The sa (de) refers to contextual origination (which is śūnya), which is a founded designation. For example, the famous chariot example, except here the parts of the chariot are equally founded designations. See our discussion below, p.78ff. May gives the same translation with a clearer discussion twenty years later in an article in Journal of Indian Philosophy, 6 no.3 (Nov. 1978), 240-1.

16. MA1, Sa 121b,2-4

17. MA1, Sa 69a,5-69b,1

18. MA1, Sa 56b, 6. Cf. Tattvasaṃgraha, 2012. See below p. 38.

19. Pramāṇasamuccaya, I,10 (Hereafter PS); PV III, 354-367.

20. PS I, 8cd,9a.

21. PS I 11-12.

22. UG, f.52,3-5.

23. Kamalaśīla explains that "non-dualists" refers to those who hold that the shes-pa alone exists (Sa 97a,1).

24. Yongs-su dpyod-pa = yongs-su gcod-pa, pariccheda.

See Stcherbatsky, Vol.1, p.412, and Vol.2, p.367. On rnam-gcod and yongs-gcod, cf. PV I,48-49, 131-34; UG, 229,3ff.

25. Cf. TS 2007; PV III,333. Merleau-Ponty states:

> "If one tried, according to the realistic approach, to make perception into some coincidence with the thing, it would no longer be possible to understand what the perceptual event was, how the subject managed to assimilate the thing, how after coinciding with the thing he was able to consign it to his own history, since ex hypothesi he would have nothing of it in his possession."

Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p.325.

26. Cf. PV III,209, 247-48. Kamalaśīla adds: "on account of ascribing the result to the cause" (Sa 99a,3), i.e., the noetic which is the cause is labelled as the result, the "reflection." A transcendent, intended object is never experienced but only postulated (see UG, f.74a,6-75a,1). Yet, there must, according to the Sautrāntikas, be some transcendent cause, which is like an object in relation to the reflection (rnam-pa) in experience (the surface of the mirror, the immanent act (shes-pa). The 'reflection' seems to partake of immanence in being contained in the act, as well as being intentional in that it points beyond itself, has (or rather is) a meaning. This 'reflection' metaphor, it seems to me, should not be taken as a physiological model of perception. Cf. the quotation

from Merleau-Ponty on the "intentionality of sensation", below p. 75.

27. _MAl_, Sa 56b,2-57b,7.

28. See H.V. Guenther, _Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice_ (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972), chapter 3.

29. See above p. 42.

30. Quoted in Dreyfus, "The Perceptual Noema," p.158

31. ibid. p.155.

32. Edmund Husserl, _The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology_, trans. by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1970), p.242.

33. ibid. pp.170-1.

34. ibid. p.164.

35. Dreyfus, "The Perceptual Noema," p.155.

36. ibid. p.167.

37. Merleau-Ponty, _The Phenomenology of Perception_, p.333.

38. ibid.

39. See below pp. 85ff.

40. See Guenther, _Buddhist Philosophy_, pp.105,106,119, 120.

41. See _UG_, f.150,6. Cf. _PV_ III,221. This seems to be the theory that Dharmakīrti favors _conventionally_.

42. This begins the examination of the "two-halves of an egg" theory. It is a critique of perception as a 'synthesis'. Cf. Merleau-Ponty, _Phenomenology of Perception_, p.325, and Neisser, _Cognitive Psychology_, pp.18ff., for a

critique of it in modern guise as "information-processing." See also Dharmakīrti's critique, PV III,198-200.

43. "Result" here means simultaneity, and "cause" rapid succession. See MAl 99b,7ff. for Kamalaśīla's commentary.

44. Here begins the examination of the theory of "an equal number of noeses and noemata." Cf. Guenther, Buddhist Philosophy, pp.105,106,118-20.

45. MAl, Sa 57b,7-59a,8.

46. Cf. Guenther, Buddhist Philosophy, p.86.

47. Gurwitsch, Studies, p.132

48. On anticipations in perception, see Neisser, p.130ff.

50. David E. Starr, Entity and Existence (New York: Burt Franklin, 1975), pp.22,113,115.

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III: MAJOR ISSUES OF THE MADHYAMAKĀLAṂKĀRA: THE CITTAMĀTRA AND ITS MADHYAMAKA CRITIQUE

According to Mi-pham, the third major issue of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra is:

> "The claim, as in the Cittamātra, in which the variety of presences as an object-in-itself (*phyi-don*) is present by virtue of one's own experience (*sems*)."[1]

He explains this as follows:

> "By accepting the variety of presences as the magical play (*rnam-'phrul*) of experience, one knows the ultimate descriptive mode of being (*yin-lugs*) of the conventional and obtains a trusting conviction (*yid-ches*) about the way in which one is involved in and disengaged from *saṃsāra*. Regarding this, in respect of the presence of Being (*gnas-lugs*) which is free from all discursiveness, characteristics, and objectification, even the statement, 'Presence is experience,' is not established. While this is the ultimate which is beyond the conventional, when one remains in the range of conventional presence, since the existence of an object-in-itself is contradicted by reasoning and 'experience only' is established by reasoning, if one asserts a conventional which does not go beyond the level of naive perception (*tshur-mthong*), there is no going beyond that.

If one investigates the entities merely posited by virtue of conceptualization, although they are not at all established, there is no cessation of infallible presencing by means of one's experience. This is established through the power of a mere presence for-oneself or experiential presence. If one goes beyond that, although it is the level of the ultimate which is beyond the conventional, one should know that a conventional position which is higher than that is impossible. Therefore, Dharmakīrti also (said) that the essential point which clarifies establishment of the conventional, the intended meaning which sees the existential mode of Being of particular existents just as they are with the eye of the originary awareness of Buddhahood, is just this. If this is so, conventional means of knowledge and the ultimate are harmonized and demonstrated: this is the distinguishing feature of this treatise. Thus, if one understands presence as the play of experience itself, (this is) the way to obtain certainty regarding involvement in and disengagement from saṃsāra.

By virtue of the sedimenting (bzhag) of various erroneous habituating tendencies in experience, in the uninterrupted stream of projective existence a variety of presences are present like in a dream.

Because there is no other cause apart from experience for this, experience which has come under the power of emotionality enters into the realm of projective existence and even the hand of the Tathāgata cannot put a stop to it."[2]

Elsewhere in his introduction to the Madhyamakālaṃkāra, Mi-pham sums up the Cittamātra-Madhyamaka relation in this way:

"Since the very fact of the relative (gzhan-dbang) as the ground of the conceptual (kun-btags) is not established in truth, one should be aware of the refutation by Candrakīrti and others.[3] All of these arguments which refute the horizonal awareness (kun-gzhi rnam-shes) and reflexive awareness, although they apply to the acceptance of reflexive awareness as established in truth by the Cittamātra, one should know that they do not apply to all aspects of the method which affirms the horizonal awareness and reflexive awareness merely conventionally. For example, the resoning which refutes the establishment in truth of all cause and result, as well as psychophysical constituents, components of experience, and sense fields, does not contradict the acceptance of cause and result and the establishment of the psychophysical constituents and experiential components merely conventionally by the Mādhyamikas. One should know

that the ātman as an eternal substance, etc., of the Tīrthikas is impossible even conventionally. In brief, if (something) is established as existing on the level of conventional valid means of knowledge, conventionally who is able to refute it, while if there is a contradiction according to conventional valid means, who is able to establish its existence conventionally? If (something) is found to be non-existent through a logical inquiry from the ultimate (point of view), then who is able to establish that it exists ultimately? This is the reality (chos-nyid) of all particular existents."[4]

The key passage here involves the application of the Madhyamaka technical term "existence in truth" (bden-grub) to the Cittamātra theories. It is always a difficult problem when one philosophical approach criticizes another using its own terms. How can we mediate these claims? As mentioned in chapter I,[5] we shall try to do this through a reflection on contemporary phenomenology.

Don Ihde, in his Experimental Phenomenology, has hit on a brilliant means of introduction to the complexities of the phenomenological method initiated by Edmund Husserl, through an investigation of multi-stable phenomena (e.g., the Necker cube) along phenomenological, as opposed to conventional psychological lines. This approach involves a deconstruction of the phenomena, which is made possible by

the _epoché_ or "suspension of belief in accepted reality claims."[6] As Ihde states,[7]

> "Deconstruction accurs by means of variational method, which possibilizes all phenomena in seeking their structures. In this context, _epoché_ includes suspension of belief in any causes of the visual effects and positively focuses upon what is and may be seen."

It is important to note here that the _epoché_ does not establish a pre-suppositionless viewpoint or a disinterested spectator, as is often thought,[8] rather it "is needed to open the possibilities of the seen to their topographical features."[9] That is, the _epoché_ is the beginning of the de-struction of the sedimented (habituating) _passivity_ of ordinary perception in the "natural attitude." It does not reveal a fundamental stratum of reality in a 'pure description,' but is the basis for "the attainment of a new and _open_ noetic context."[10] It is a matter of educating ourselves to see more, just as a bird-watcher (the example is Ihde's) learns to 'see' the markings of different species of birds not 'seen' by the naive viewer. Here the ambiguous term 'see' is given a precise meaning:[11]

> "The educated viewer does not create these markings (of the birds), because they are there to be discovered, but — in phenomenological language — he _constitutes_ them. He recognizes and fulfills his perceptual intention and so sees the markings as meaningful."

Although utilizing the dubious Husserlian language of perceptual intention and fulfillment which we have had occasion to criticize above, Ihde tries to steer a middle

course between Husserl and his 'existentialist' critics. The important point of concern to us here is that perception is an active process, an activity of knowing (the nirākārajñānavāda being a classic example of passivity), which has often been noted in the modern West, especially since the advent of Gestalt psychology. Phenomenologists of perception, such as Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty, have in effect tried to work out an adequate philosophy of the perceptual Gestalt. It should be noted here that a rejection of the passivity of perception does not entail making it into a judgment — the extreme of "Intellectualism." Rudolf Arnheim, in his well-known study of art and psychology in the Gestaltist tradition, Art and Visual Perception, states:[12]

> "...in looking at an object, we reach out for it. With an invisible finger we move through the space around us, go out to the distant places where things are found, touch them, catch them, scan their surfaces, trace their borders, explore their texture. Perceiving shapes is an eminently active occupation."

Yet, paradoxically it seems, we must struggle to recover what is already ours: the creative activity of perception. Phenomenology is no longer description, but prescription, as we shall see.

Sedimented, habitual ways of perceiving limit the possibilities of the 'object' to a static 'essence' (svabhāva), i.e., "an exhaustively specifiable and unvarying mode of being."[13] For example, for most people (and the psychologists who test them), the Necker cube has two possibilities,

either as a forward-downward-facing cube or a forward-upward-facing cube. But this is merely due to the laziness of conventionalized viewing. There are other equally 'essential' possibilities of the topographical form known as the Necker cube, i.e., other ways to 'see' (gestalt) it without doing violence to the form. Ihde reveals three other possibilities. This is what is meant by opening the form to its topographical structure. Any of these possibilities (noema) is correlated with a way of looking (noesis). But this does not mean that perception is a series of thin, transparent presences, as we have remarked before. Ihde states:[14]

> "What is important to note in this account is the co-presence within experience of both a profile and latently meant absence which, together, constitute the Presence of a thing. To forget or ignore the latent or meant aspect of the Presence of the thing reduces the appearance of the world to a facade, lacking weightiness and opacity. Phenomenologists also claim that what makes any object 'transcendent,' having genuine otherness, is locatable in this play of presence and absence-in-presence in our perception of things. But note that transcendence is constituted <u>within</u> experience,..."

Both the Cittamātra and Madhyamaka trends within Mahāyāna Buddhism claim to be exegesis on the <u>Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras</u>, whose message may be epitomized as, 'Presence is openness and openness is presence.' The Necker cube example, phenomenologically considered, provides us with an excellent tool for showing their two different approaches to this statement.

The Cittamātra emphasizes the inseparability of noesis

('dzin-pa, grāhaka) and noema (gzung-ba, grāhya), in order to establish that there is no object-in-itself but "only experience" (sems-tsam, cittamātra). This dualistic mode of presencing into an object-in-itself and a subject-for-itself is occasioned by the maturation (smin-pa) or activation (sad-pa) of habituating tendencies (bag-chags, vāsanā), which we may refer to as 'schemata' in regard to perception.[15] This dualism is analyzed into a tri-partite structure in Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra XI, 40 and Madhyāntavibhāga III, 22 as follows:[16]

NOEMA	NOESIS
world-as-horizon (gnas; pratiṣṭhā, pada)	ego-act (emotively-toned) (yid, manas or nyon-yid, kliṣṭa-manas)
objects within horizon (don, longs-spyod; bhoga, artha)	thematization (rnam-rtog, vikalpa)
body as focal-point of experience (lus; deha)	sense perception ('dzin, udgraha or rnam-shes, vijñāna)

These presences characterize the contextuality of experience (gzhan-dbang, paratantra) as a duality. The habituating tendencies which constitute this experience, collectively as a 'stream' or 'stratum' (cf. Husserl: substrate of habitualities) are known as foundational-horizonal perception (kun-gzhi rnam-shes, ālaya-vijñāna), an indistinct awareness of being-in-the-world, including the appropriation of these habitualities (sa-bon, bīja) and the body as one's own. These are technically known as the referents (dmigs-pa, ālambana) of the horizonal awareness.[17] Contextuality is the basis for straying into a world of fictions (the in-it-

self and for-itself) (kun-btags, parikalpita) or divesting oneself of these fictions and recognizing the real in its initial purity (yongs-grub, parinispanna). The interpretation of contextuality is the crucial issue in assessing Madhyamaka critiques of the Cittamātra. For the Cittamātra, the parikalpita is non-existent (Mahayanasamgraha, II,26)[18] in being a mere name for the reality (bdag) on the paratantra level to which it refers (MS II, 24). The paratantra is the basis for the dualistic presencing of the parikalpita (snang-gzhi; cf. MS II, 2, where the term snang-ba'i gnas is used). The paratantra is said to be like a dream, an apparition, etc. Triṃśikā 24 explains the reason for this: the contextual is without actual origination (utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā, skye-ba ngo-bo-nyid med-pa), because it does not come about by itself but is dependent upon others, i.e., context.[19] This contextuality is none other than the maturation of sedimented and habituating noetic-noematic contexts, i.e., the activity of the ālaya-vijñāna, being (cognitive)-in-the-world.

To return to the Necker cube example, gestalts of the form in any of its possibilities, such as a cube, are not private sense-data nor are they passive views of a single 'object'. Rather, active ways of looking intend or structure the form in different ways, but one could equally say that the seen actualizes the seer. In Ihde's language, the order of perception and the sedimentation of beliefs

are inseparable, but we may focus on either through his two "strategies," the transcendental and the hermeneutic.[20] Notice: the sedimented order is on the noetic and the noematic sides. Here is where Husserl's transcendental strategy of intentions and fulfillments is weak: by fulfilling one's intentions isn't one just substituting one form of habituation for another? Admittedly, phenomenological viewing opens up the phenomena more than naive viewing does. That is, one doesn't escape from contextuality though the <u>epoché</u> but realizes its openness by freeing oneself from habituation to a non-contextual subject and object, as the Yogācāra would say. One realizes that the object is not just 'there' but is constituted. That is, what do we mean by objectivity, how does it arise within experience? The possibilities of the Necker cube are not mere appearances <u>of</u> some-thing, which must be known in order to verify them. I cannot see the 'cube' as an ostrich, although I can see it as a strangely cut gem if I follow Idhe's "strategies."[21] I can learn to adjust my "noetic focus" to see the different possibilities ('If you do so and so, you will see such and such.'), but there are no intersubjective instructions for seeing the 'cube' as an ostrich.

This problem of 'appearance' has been a great stumbling block in the way of the analytic/linguistic tradition's understanding of phenomenology (and their tendency, if they consider it at all, to see it as a kind of phenomenalism). For example, in his book <u>Sensation and Perception</u>, D.W.Hamlyn expresses his

central critique of phenomenology (with specific reference to Merleau-Ponty) as follows:[22]

> "An investigation of this pre-objective world would be an investigation of the categories applicable to perceptual consciousness prior (logically and perhaps temporally prior) to the construction of an objective world. Merleau-Ponty has much of interest to say about this. But the question may still be asked whether he has any right to assume that the necessary 'bracketing-off' has been complete. May his account not be after all another account of how things appear to us under very special conditions? As befits a 'descriptive psychology', phenomenology may largely be looked upon as an attempt to describe how things appear under different conditions. But once it is assumed that a pure experience can be discovered, the use of words like 'appears' becomes inappropriate. In saying that we are studying how things appear to us, we presuppose the notion of things and how they really are (for we use the word 'appears' very largely to make a contrast with how things really are). It is difficult in consequence to see how a description of appearances can be a description of pure experience.
> In this respect Phenomenology finds itself in the same dilemma as Ayer. Either we can look on the experience as basic or we can define it in terms of appearances <u>but</u> <u>not</u> <u>both</u>."

Such critiques of phenomenology are very helpful, for they push it on to better self-understanding, i.e., that phenomenology at a certain point ceases to be description and becomes prescriptive.[23] Merleau-Ponty himself realized that, "The most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction."[24] Phenomenology is not pure presuppositionless description of the perceived-intended-as-such, but the opening of phenomena as illustrated in the Necker cube example. The "very special conditions" of phenomenological seeing are not just another habituated,

naive way of seeing. Hume does not have as much right to say he is describing phenomena as Husserl.[25] The "pure experience" of phenomenology is the open noetic-noematic complex which discovers presences and not mere apprarances. Hamlyn's appeal to the proper usage of the word 'appears' is based on naive (pre-reduction) presuppositions. Phenomenology cuts through Wittgenstein's 'seeing/ seeing-as' dichotomy.[26] We have shown how the "notion of things and how they really are" is constituted within experience. For reasons such as these misunderstandings of 'appearance' we have avoided this term as a translation of snang-ba (ābhāsa) in the Yogācāra or Madhyamaka context, preferring "presence". It is unfortunate one speaks of phenomenological description, where explication would be the better term. Phenomenology is not description of ordinary experience so much as prescription for that experience as transformed by radical reflection or explication. That is, reflection modifies the reflected-on by opening it up and situating it, such as to make pre-suppositionless description impossible. Ultimately, there is nothing to describe, Śāntarakṣita would say. Or Merleau-Ponty: "nothing exists... everything is temporalized".[27] But in order to understand this one must try to radically reflect, to undertake the reduction. Once one is on one's way, experience, the dialectic of reflection and reflected-on, or as Merleau-Ponty put it, "the communication of a finite subject with an opaque being from which it emerges but to which it remains committed,"[28]

widens and deepens. As the old-saying goes, "You can lead a horse to water but you can't make him drink," as two critics of Merleau-Ponty have noted:[29]

> "But there is no way of proving a priori that a phenomenological description of perception will provide an account of the genesis of experience. Those who refuse to undertake the experiment will remain forever unconvinced. This Merleau-Ponty readily admits. 'In this sense (phenomenological) reflection is a system of thought as self-enclosed as madness.' 'But', he maintains, 'this change of standpoint is justified in the outcome by the abundance of phenomena which it makes comprehensible'

The goal of this so-called 'description', which is rather a deconstruction, is to deconstruct until there is nothing left to deconstruct, or rather, to realize that there has never been anything to deconstruct, the world not being a construction or constitution of 'transcendental' experience.

A subtle constructivism remains within the Yogācāra phenomenology, and this is bound up with their theory of the three constitutive principles of reality (ngo-bo nyid gsum, trisvabhāva), whose crucial focus is the contextual (paratantra). There is a crucial ambiguity here which forms the basis for the later developments of the sākārajñānavāda and nirākārajñānavāda. Does presence (snang-ba, ābhāsa) or the perceptual noema (rnam-pa, ākāra) belong to the parikalpita or the paratantra? In Husserlian language: "is the perceptual sense (Wahrnehmungssinn) to be understood as the interpretive sense (Auffassungsinn) or as the intuitive sense (Anschauungssinn)?"[30] If the noema belongs to the

parikalpita, then this is the position of the nirākārajñāna-vāda or alīkājñānavāda (rnam-rdzun-pa),[31] which is examined by Śāntarakṣita on vv. 52-60. If presence belongs to the paratantra, then this is the position of the sākārajñāna-vāda (among the Yogācāra, which should not be confused with the sākāra among the Sautrāntikas, discussed by Śāntarakṣita above, vv. 22-34), which is examined by Śāntarakṣita in vv. 46-51.[32]

The earlier (classical) Yogācāra (of Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and Sthiramati) avoided this problem by stating that the vasanas as cause and effect were simultaneous, the structuring (sedimenting) arises and ceases together with the structured (sedimented), like the odor of a flower perfuming sesame seeds.[33] Or, they held that the relation between the parikalpita and the paratantra is one of 'both...and' or 'neither...nor', as Ruegg has pointed out in analyzing the Madhyāntavibhāga:[34]

> "On the ontological level, the Vijñānavādin speaks both of sattva 'existence' with respect to abhūtaparikalpita and śūnyatā, and of asattva 'non existence' with respect to duality (MV I,3),..."

and,[35]

> "...if abhūtaparikalpita is then neither as it appears, i.e. as affected by duality - nor altogether non-existent - because it is the condition for error and for release - this is to be understood in terms of the theory of the three natures (svabhāva) of the Yogācāra. That is, abhūtaparikalpa as paratantrasvabhāva exists as such: where as it is not as it appears when affected by the subject/object duality of the parikalpitasvabhāva, once freed from the latter it is the perfect nature of the pariniṣpannasva-

bhāva (MVBh 1.6)."

Why this ambiguity (see above p.73)? Because, as we have indicated already, the perceived-as-such is never complete and implicates the rest of the phenomenal field. The 'object' is always determinable but never determinate. The intentionality of perception is not a transparent positing of meaning by a consciousness. As Merleau-Ponty says of 'Intellectualism':[36]

> "The object is made determinate as an identifiable being only through a whole open series of possible experiences, and exists only for a subject who carries out this identification. Being is exclusively for someone who is able to step back from it and thus stand wholly outside being. In this way the mind becomes the subject of perception and the notion of 'significance' becomes inconceivable."

And then he says of the intentionality of sensation:[37]

> "The sensation of blue is not the knowledge or positing of a certain identifiable quale throughout all the experiences of it which I have, as the geometer's circle is the same in Paris and Tokyo. It is in all probability intentional, which means that it does not rest in itself as does a thing, but that it is directed and has significance beyond itself. But what it aims at is recognized only blindly, through my body's familiarity with it. It is not constituted in the full light of day, it is reconstituted or taken up once more by a knowledge which remains latent, leaving it with its opacity and its thisness."

The ambiguities of the Yogācāra-phenomenology seem only to get richer. Is there perhaps another way to attack the problem, to deal with the contextuality of experience?

Tsong-kha-pa, in the course of commenting on the long section of the sixth chapter of the Madhyamakāvatāra

in which Candrakīrti has critiqued the Yogācāra, states:[38]

> "Regarding the Madhyamaka and Cittamātra approaches, there is no difference as to making these presences as internal and external entities the basis for the obsessiveness (mngon par zhen-pa) of sentient beings. Indeed they are also similar on account of reversing the obsession with this basis showing these (entities) as open (śūnya), yet they are not the same in regard to (what they consider to be) the manner of this obsession (zhen-tshul). For the Cittamātra, dualistic presence as inner and outer, noesis and noema, as a seeming presence (snang-ba ltar), is obsession with the noesis and noema as separate substances (rdzas). Having taken hold of presence as a subject matter (chos-can) in its contextuality as an antidote to this (obsessiveness), since they refute the existence of noesis and noema as separate substances, the (fault) that the basis of negation (dgag-gzhi) is that which is to be negated (dgag-bya), is refuted. In the Madhyamaka perspective, the manner of obsession is the obsession with presence, which has not been posited by conventional intellect, as being established in truth. Having taken hold of this presence as subject matter as an antidote to this (obsessiveness), (since) they refute (by demonstrating) 'the non-existence in-truth of such (an entity),' the (fault) that the basis of negation is that which is to be negated, is refuted."

We have already seen how the Cittamātra uses contextuality to show that this very contextuality is devoid of (śūnya) the duality of noesis and noema. But what does he mean by "obsession with presence, which has not been posited by conventional intellect, as being established in truth" as the mode of obsession the Mādhyamakas are refuting?

To return again to our example, the Madhyamaka offers what I would call a more radical de-construction of multistable phenomena. We have seen that each variation is a

gestalt. The Cittamātra have shown how a gestalt does not come into being apart from its sedimented contextuality. It is never ob-ject. But what is the internal structure of a Gestalt-as-noema itself? A gestalt has a "dynamic", "hidden structure", to use Arnheim's terms, who also states: "Visual perception consists in the experiencing of visual forces."[39] These forces seem occult and subjective to the psycho-physiologist still under the spell of the "stimulus error" and the "constancy hypothesis", those psychological counterparts of the atomism of British Empiricism.[40] These "forces" are the expression of the famous gestalt part-whole complex. A part is a "whole-part":[41]

> "What a person or animal perceives is not only an arrangement of objects, of colors and shapes, of movements and sizes. It is, perhaps first of all, an interplay of directed tensions. These tensions are not something the observer adds, for reasons of his own, to static images .... Notice further that if the disk is seen as striving toward the center of the square, it is being attracted by something not physically present in the picture. The center point is not identified by any marking in figure 1;



figure 1

> as invisible as the North Pole or the Equator, it is nonetheless a part of the perceived pattern, an invisible focus of power, established at a considerable distance by the outline of the square. It is 'induced', as one electric current can be induced by another. There are, then, more things in the field of vision than those that strike the retina of the eye... Such perceptual inductions differ from logical inferences. Inferences are thought operations that add something to the given visual facts by interpreting them."

These "perceptual forces" and "tensions" make multi-stable phenomena possible. A given variation is actualized, say a forward-downward-facing cube, when point A is seen forward and down (as part of a forward-downward-facing cube). It is difficult to focus on A in the rear of a forward-upward-facing cube, but B can easily be seen as forward and up as part of such a cube. A and B have completely different significances in these cases, defferent meanings (which are not intellectual judgments) as "part-wholes" in different variational structures. Intentions are "fulfilled" not as 'ideal' variations of positings by a transparent consciousness, but, as Merleau Ponty states,[42]



> "a sensible datum which is on the point of being felt sets a kind of muddled problem for my body to solve. I must find the attitude which <u>will</u> provide it with the means of becoming determinate, ... I must find the reply to a question which is obscurely expressed."

But what makes such gestalts possible? The Gestalt psychologists, as natural scientists, looked to the structure of the nervous system, phenomenologists to noetic-noematic correlations. But this phenomenon can be opened up further. Here is where the Madhyamaka critique enters. What is the relation between the whole and the part? Does seeing the part produce the whole? Which comes first, or are they simultaneous? <u>How</u> do they depend on each other? <u>How</u> are they contextual? The Yogācāra accepts that they are; contextuality <u>exists</u>, but

no separate, individual existence comes into being (utpattiniḥ-svabhāva). The part-whole relation is just one of many relations referred to by the Madhyamaka as upādāya prajñapti (brten-nas btags-pa),[43] idampratyayatāmātra (rkyen-nyid 'di-pa tsam), parasparāpekṣikīsiddhi (phan-tshun bltos-pa'i grub-pa).[44] This is indeed the Madhyamaka interpretation of pratītya-samutpāda as śūnyatā. In his commentary on Mūlamadhyamakakārikā VIII, 13c-d, Candrakīrti gives us a list of such relations: act and agent, appropriated and appropriator, producer and produced, mover and movement, seer and seen, characteristic and characterized, originator and originated, part and whole (literally, "part-possessor"), substance and quality, and means of knowledge and object of knowledge.[45] These are not merely intellectual constructions but have their source in experience which the Madhyamaka calls prapañca (spros-pa), discursiveness, linguistic proliferation (which is intimately related to vikalpa (rnam-rtog), dichotomous conceptualization, thematization).[46] Not to understand relation in this way is what Tsong-kha-pa called "obsession with presence, which hasn't been posited by conventional intellect, as being established in truth."[47] It is not established in truth, is not worthy of the name "existence" in the Madhyamaka understanding, but is a mere appropriation of one to the other, which may become a mutual conspiracy, if we may use such language, if not properly understood. This "dependent origination" is not causality or even conditionality (the conditions (pratyaya, rkyen),

having been refuted by Nāgārjuna in MMK I).

Our common-sense and usual natural scientific notions of causality are deeply rooted in the experience of 'making things happen.' Much of Husserl's problems that we have seen with intentionality and its 'object' stem from such an 'agency' perspective: I can, I "hold sway."[48] I can push this away. I can also raise my arm. In the second case, the problem is compounded by trying to subsume the mental and physical under this notion of causality. But in both cases, the question remains (which these causal notions don't address): what 'gives' my arm to what it pushes, what 'gives' my intention to the movement of my arm. How do they belong together?[49] (With the Yogācāra we have inquired into the role of habituating tendencies in making the contextual 'relate'.) Not, how are they coordinated or correlated, but how do they co-respond? How are they appropriated and appropriate to one another? To inquire into how even two sub-atomic particles "belong together" in a causal relation is to inquire into the deepest questions of physics - what is the order of their relation, i.e. the orders of time, space, motion, measurement. (The 'over-coming' of Newtonian physics by relativity and quantum mechanics has still not received satisfactory philosophical interpretation.) An object I move must 'belong' to my movement in the 'order' of mover and moved. Although my arm which I move is not just an object, it is also a part of this 'order' of mover and moved. Mover and moved are a field of

action, in moving my arm this field is the expressive space of gesture. The physicist's measuring device is a gesture in the field of the space constituted by the methodology of his science. This does not make it 'merely subjective' any more than the symbolism of bodily gesture is 'merely subjective'. That is, the gesture is solicited, but this solicitation is already interpreted (appropriated) through the hermenentical 'as' of understanding,[50] whether everyday or scientific. Aesthetic theories centered on 'expression' neglect the solicitation with which expression "belongs together", just like theories of scientific descovery which emphasize psychological factors, neglecting the hermeneutical situation of the scientist in his tradition.[51] Further, in this belonging together in or through a field all dualities (prapañca, prajñapti) are the Same (mnyam-nyid, samatā) in the openness of the field, but this is to anticipate the Madhyamaka 'conclusion'.

The part and the whole belong together through a field called space, which is not an empty container, but, from the earliest times in Buddhism was defined as having the function of "opening up a place," "making room" (go-'byed) for events.[52] Śāntideva, in the Prāsangika context, has provided us with a radical deconstruction of the body as a part-whole gestalt in Bodhicaryāvatāra IX, 78-87, in his presentation of Kāyasmṛtyupasthāna (lus dran-pa nye-bar bzhag-pa), the application of attentiveness to the body.[53] If the body (as whole) is composed of parts, is the body contained in each of its

parts? If so, this would lead to the absurd consequence of as many bodies as parts. No, my body is partially contained in its parts, that's what it means to _be_ a part. But what is a part apart from this circular definition as, 'a part of the body?' A part, for its own sake (if you try to give it some independent, 'absolute' status), may be continually divided and so never become a solid basis to be built up into a body. Only the part-whole gestalt holds it, but this relation is untenable. The body is not a part-whole relation, but is open like space, or rather the opening for the space of motility and gesture.

Śāntarakṣita, as mentioned above, proceeds dialectically, accepting superior conventional theories, and then going on to critique them 'from the ultimate point of view.' After showing the superiority of the _sākāra_ over the _nirākāra_, he proceeded to critique the _sākāra_ of the Sautrāntikas (cf. the previous chapter). Now he proceeds, at first to show the superiority of the Cittamātra to the Sautrāntika, after which he examines whether the _sākāra_ and _nirākāra_ of the Cittamātra (as mentioned above, p.73), that is, whether the perceptual noema, can withstand the critique of "neither unitary nor multiple." dKon-mchog 'Jigs-med dbang-po explains the two varieties as follows:[54]

> "However, while both parties, whether they consider sensa to be veridical or delusive, agree that when the eye perceives a patch of blue there is an appearance of blue and this seems to be an external object, those who claim sensa to be veridical attribute their appearance as an ex-

ternal object to the working of un-knowing, but not so the appearance of blue as blue and the appearance of blue as the epistemological object of the perceptual situation. Therefore, among the mentalists those who claim the epistmological object of the perceptual situation to have literally all the qualities it seems to display have the mark of considering sensa to be true, while those who do not do so have the mark of considering sensa to be delusive."

The sākāra, as in the case of the Sautrāntikas, are divided into the three theories of "two halves of an egg" (vv. 46-8), "an equal number of noeses and noemata" (v.49), and "the non-duality of the multiple" (vv. 50-1). As mentioned above, the only difference between the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra theories of perception is that the Yogācāras can dispense with the hypothetical "external object". Hence Śāntarakṣita's arguments parallel those against the Sautrāntika theories. Thus, through the "neither unitary nor multiple" critique, the perceived-as-such, the ambiguity of the Husserlian-Yogācāra noema is radically de-constructed.

Śāntarakṣita begins with a statement of the general Cittamātra approach:

"Those intelligent, good people who rely on the approach of the insider's system of 'Experience-only', (say) that perception comes about dependent on the complete maturation of suitable habitualities. In regard to this approach of those who say, 'As soon as (an entity) arises, it is destroyed, and, in reality, there is no experiencer nor that which is experienced,' we summarize (as follows):

The noemata which magically appear by the maturation of habituating tendencies since beginningless time,

Although present, through error are like an apparition.//44

The ultimate particles of the sensory fields of form, etc., substance, qualities, etc., which are spoken of by the followers of view-points superior and inferior, are logically untenable because they are without the defining characteristic of experiencer and experience, and are like a city of clouds, a circle of fire, a magical creation, a dream, an apparition, and the reflection of the moon in water. Even these perceptual noemata which are present to the noetic which claims (its) intentional object (dmigs-pa) to be veridical, are present by virtue of the complete maturation of the habituating tendencies for obsession with particular existents having their origination in beginningless existence.

This (approach) is a good one, yet (the question remains) are these particular existents real or not.

One must still inquire into the acceptance of what is merely experienced but not investigated.//45

One should know that this approach is very clear from both scripture and reasoning, and since it is also

an antidote to the noxious obsession with limitless intentional objects, it is very good. The logical inquiry explained before, which showed the untenability of the characteristics of experiencer and experience and negated the existence of ultimate particles, etc., is made very clear by this approach.... Knowledgeable people, relying on this approach, remove the wrong-headed notions involved with the distinctions of apprehending (noesis) and apprehendable (noema), and self and what belongs to self.

Yet, there should be a little (further) investigation of this. Are these perceptual noemata genuinely real (de-kho-na nyid) or not? That which is enjoyed merely without investigating it, like a reflection, etc. - what follows from this?

> If, ultimately (perception exists), perceptions (corresponding to many noemata) would be multiple. And further,
>
> These (perceptual noemata) would become unitary (since perception is unitary); Because these two (unitariness and multiplicity) are contradictory, (perception and noema) would certainly be separate.//46

Because a genuinely existing perceptual noema is not separate (from a noesis), then just like the perceptual noemata, the perception would become a

multiplicity. Further, because perception is a unitary (act) and not separate (from the noema), then it would be difficult to refute (the consequence) that the perceptual noemata, just like the perception, would become unitary. Because of this contradiction, ultimately, perception and the perceptual noema would (have to) be separate.

To explain another fault:

> If you claim that these (perceptual noemata) are not
> multiple, then, because of the unity of
> movement and non-movement, etc.,
> There would be the absurd consequence that all
> would move, etc. It is difficult to answer
> (this objection).//47

It is taught that this very (perception) is "undivided." Therefore, if a single perceptual noema is taken as movement, etc., or as yellow, etc., then the remaining ones would all become like this. If this is not so, then there would undoubtedly be multiplicity.

This consequence is now shown to be similar (to the case of the approach) in which one asserts a noesis which possesses a noema while (also accepting) independently-existing objects.

> If, as in the case of those (who claim) an ob-
> ject-in-itself, (here in the Cittamātra) per-
> ceptual noemata are inseparable (from noeses),

Then, irrefutably everything would become one.//48"[55]

Verse 49 merely refers to the arguments of vv.31-34 regarding the theory of "An equal number of noeses and noemata":

"But if perception were admitted (by you) to be
equal in number to its corresponding noemata,
Then it would be difficult for you to avoid the
critique which was made similarly regarding
ultimate particles.//49"[56]

Verses 50-51 similarly hark back to their counterparts in verses 22-23 among the Sautrāntikas ("The non-duality of the multiple"):

"If, although (noemata) are various, (the noetic)
is unitary, is this not the approach (of the
Jains called) Digambaras?
A multiplicity is not unitary, like several gems,
etc.//50
If a variety (of noemata) are unitary, then how
could there be this multiplicity
Of appearance as various, such as obscured and
not obscured?//51"[57]

Attention now turns to those who hold noemata to be inherently delusive (<u>alīkākāravāda</u>, <u>rnam-rdzun-pa</u>), i.e., the noetic is ultimately without noemata (<u>nirākārajñānavāda</u>, <u>rnam-med-pa</u>).[58] First Śāntarakṣita presents the <u>pūrvapakṣa</u>:

"But if in actuality, there didn't exist these
perceptual noemata of this (noesis),

Then ultimately they would appear through error
for the perception which is without a perceptual
noema.//52

Perception is ultimately like a clear crystal. Since it doesn't become transformed into specific noemata of blue, etc., noemata appear, in such a case, by virtue of the maturation of errant habitualities since beginningless time. It is like the appearance of horses and elephants, etc. from a piece of clay before the eyes of people who have been deceived by mantras, etc.

If (these noemata) do not exist, how are they
experienced clearly?
Such a perceptual noesis which is separate from
its (noema) is not (possible).//53

How could one not accept that even these ultimately non-existent (noemata) are clearly perceived? We say:

Wherein a particular existant does not exist,
therein the knowledge of that (non-existence)
does not exist.
Just like happiness in unhappiness, and non-
white in white.//54

If one says regarding this: there is no opportunity for doubt regarding the non-instance of a negative example, if there exists a contradiction to the means of proof and a rejection of what is to be proven. We reply:

A perceptual noema cannot be accepted as a con-

crete object of a noesis,

Since it is (according to you) separate from the very being of the noesis, like a flower in the sky.//55

Perception is that which is not of the nature of insentience; if a (perceptual noema) is the object of a designation which is not ascribed (as being of the nature of perception), then such a noema, such as blue, would be impossible, like a flower in the sky, since it is different from the nature of perception.

Since that which does not exist is without the ability (to give rise to perception), even a mere postulation would be impossible, like a hare's horn.

Since there is no (such perceptual noema) there can be no ability to produce a noesis (intending) a real presence.//56

A perceptual noema which is powerless to give rise to a self-evident perception is an impossible object even postulationally. A non-existent horse's horn could not produce a self-evident perception or become a basis for a postulation. We shall make another examination. (Regarding) this noema,

On account of what would a (noema) exist and its apodictic experience (be present)? How could there be a relation with a noesis?

(Since) there is no real (noema, there is no
relation to) a real noesis, and (the noema)
doesn't come about from this (noesis).//57

This (noema) is not the noetic, since, (if it were, then) just like the noetic there would be the fault of it existing (genuinely, contrary to your claim); or there would be the fault of the perception not existing (if it were like) the noema. That which is non-existent doesn't even come about from the noetic, since there is nothing to be produced. If it comes about from this (noetic), then, because (they) would exist earlier and later, there would be the fault of not being perceived simultaneously. (As to) a noema which is observed at the sametime as a noesis:

If there is no cause (for the noema), how could
it come about at various times?
(A perceptual noema) which is caused, for what
reason would it be excluded from contextuality?//58

Since the noema is non-existent it is without a cause. If it is without a cause it is impossible for it to come about at various times, since it doesn't depend (on anything). If one claims that it is caused, saying that this error comes about, then (regarding) what one has just accepted as existing, we are able to answer that it would become contextual and wouldn't come about without (a cause). Relativity which comes about con-

textually means not to be independent. There is no existence apart from origination from conditions. To state another error if one claims there is no noema:

> When there is no (perceptual noema) still (one
>   claims) a perceptual act will be (experienced)
>   without a perceptual noema --
> But a noesis which is like a clear crystal is
>   not to be experienced.//59

A visual perception, etc., posited as being free from a noema such as blue, which is like a uncolored crystal, is not to be observed. If there are no external or internal noemata one would perceive only this. The (arguments based on) illusions caused by jaundice, etc, become untenable since they can be doubted and contested.

> If one claims that this (noema) is known
>   by virtue of error, how is that (noema) dependent on error?
> If it (comes about) through the power of error,
>   this (noema) is then contextual.//60

For example, one whose eyes are afflicted by jaundice, cognizes a perceptual noema of yellow on a shell although it doesn't exist. In the same way, by virtue of the erroneous habituating tendencies, perceptual noemata such as yellow, while non-existent, are claimed as manifestly true. One should think in regard to this,

'How is this (noema) dependent on the erroneous habituating tendencies?' If it is a relation characterized by origination, then (the noema) is contextual since it comes about dependently. If the very being of the result of the habituating tendencies is related by identity to error, then like error, it would be difficult to avoid it becoming contextual.

Because of this (i.e., there being no relation), it is answered: "For example, in a fearful desert, a small distance appears great," etc.,[59] are stated because there is presence, although there is no noema, for intelligent people who are powerless because of obsession with an object in-itself....

Because there has been no relation established between the perceptual noema, such as blue, and habituating tendencies and error, then, having overcome the latter, even at the time of purity, all the perceptual noemata wouldn't be overcome. If there is no relation, then by overcoming one, there would be no certainty of overcoming the other, like a horse and a cow."[60]

Kamalaśīla adds:

"Does error refer to the habituating tendencies or to the noetic which possesses the error which has come about? In the first case, since there is no relationship between the perceptual noema and the habituating tendencies, it doesn't make sense to say that perceptual

noemata are experienced by the power of habituating tendencies....

In the second case, if the error-possessing noetic and the perceptual noemata are related, yet are only characterized by the (relation of) identity, since (error) is experienced at the same time as the noetic, (this relation) could not be characterized by origination. Two simultaneous events cannot be characterized as cause and effect. Therefore, regarding 'the very being of the result of habituating tendencies,' etc., since, just like error, they are not different from the noetic, it is difficult to avoid the consequence of contextuality."[61]

Notes to Chapter III

1. See above p. 27.

2. UG, f.52,5-53,6.

3. This refers to Prāsangika critiques of the Cittamātra by Candrakīrti in the sixth chapter of the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, and by Śāntideva in the ninth chapter of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*.

4. UG, f.45,1-5. Mi-pham also states in his commentary on the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*:

> "So, if this presence as a noema by its very mode of being is established as not existing apart from a noesis, it is established that this presence as a noesis also does not exist. On account of this, although the noesis is established dependent upon the noema, it is never found separately. Thus, cognitiveness (*rig-pa*) in which there is no object nor subject and which is free from all the aspects of the duality of noesis and noema, naturally lucent and just inexpressible, is the completely established (*yongs-grub*) which is devoid of the two forms of ontological status. If this non-dividedness and as-it-is-ness is necessarily realized even by the Cittamātra, then it is even more the case for the Madhyamaka. According to the Cittamātra, the essential existence of this is the complete meaning of the sixteen (facets) of Openness, which they assert as freedom from discursiveness because it is inexpressible and inconceivable as any noesis or noema, internal or external, etc. Now, it is just this residue (*lhag-mar lus-pa*) of a very subtle philosophical position which posits the very fact of this inexpressible noetic (*shes-pa*) as established in truth, which should be refuted by a reasoned inquiry. As to this noetic in which there is no noesis or noema, if one claims one's own experience (*sems*) which has been unified with openness which doesn't exist in truth, as sheer lucency, pure from the very

beginning, (this) is the true Middle."
(Chos dang chos-nyid rnam-par 'byed-pa'i tshig-le'ur byas-pa'i 'grel-pa ye-shes snang-ba rnam-'byed, in Collected Writings of 'Jam-mgon 'Ju Mi-pham rgya-mtsho, Vol. 3 (Gangtok, 1976), f.626,1-627,1.) Any mention, however, of a "non-dual noetic (shes-pa)" is absent from classical Yogācāra literature. The Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā of Sthiramati speaks of an advayajñāna (ed. Yamaguchi, Suzuki Research Reprint Series, No.7, p.133.3), but this refers to the pariniṣpanna and is translated into Tibetan as gnyis-su med-pa'i ye-shes (Peking ed., Vol.109, 166,4,5). Once again, the Mādhyamikas seem to be referring to the later Cittamātra of the Logicians. Perhaps the source of this "non-dual noetic" is PV III,212, where Dharmakīrti says: "jñānasyābhedino bhedapratibhāso hy upaplavaḥ," which is rendered into Tibetan as: "tha dad med can shes pa yi/ tha dad snang ba bslad pa nyid" (ed. Miyasaka, p.69).

5. See above p. 24.

6. Don Ihde, Experimental Phenomenology (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1977), p.69.

7. ibid.

8. Husserl speaks of the "disinterested spectator" in The Crisis, for example, p.235.

9. Ihde, p.79.

10. ibid.

11. ibid. p.81.

12. Rudolf Arnheim, Art and Visual Perception, new ed.

(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1974), p.43.

13. This felicitous phrase is to be found in David Bohm, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p.153.

14. Ihde, p.63.

15. Cf. Neisser, chap. 4.

16. Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, ed. S. Lévi (Paris: Champion, 1907), p.64; Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya, ed. G.M. Nagao (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964), p.48.

17. See Triṃśikā 3, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi - Triṃśikā, ed. S. Lévi (Paris: Champion, 1925), pp. 19-21. Merleau-Ponty expresses beautifully the idea of an ālaya-vijñāna as follows (Merleau-Ponty, p.320):

> "But in reality all things are concretions of a setting, and any explicit perception of a thing survives in virtue of a previous communication with a certain atmosphere."

18. Mahāyānasaṃgraha, ed. E. Lamotte, Publications de L'Institute Orientaliste de Louvain, No.8 (Louvain: Universite de Louvain, 1973).

19. Triṃśikā 24.

20. Ihde, pp.88-90.

21. ibid. p.97f.

22. D.W. Hamlyn, Sensations and Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), pp.183-4.

23. I wish to thank Dr. David Levin for opening up this possibility of phenomenology to me in a course he gave at the Nyingma Institute, Berkeley, Calif., Summer 1978.

24. Merleau-Ponty, p.xiv.

25. See M. Kullman and C. Taylor, "The Pre-objective World," Review of Metaphysics, 1958, 130.

26. Cf. Hamlyn, pp.187-8.

27. Merleau-Ponty, p.332.

28. ibid. p.219.

29. Kullman and Taylor, p.113.

30. Dreyfus, p.152.

31. Cf. Kajiyama, "Later Mādhyamikas," p.128.

32. Cf. Bodhicaryāvatāra, IX,15-16.

33. See MS I,15.

34. D. Seyfort Ruegg, "The Uses of the Four Positions of the Catuṣkoṭi and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism," J. of Indian Philosophy, 5 (1977), p.23.

35. ibid. p.25.

36. Merleau-Ponty, p.212.

37. ibid. p.213. On the meaning of "reconstitution" see ibid. p.326.

38. Tsong-kha-pa, bsTan-bcos chen-po dbu-ma la 'jug-pa'i rnam-bshad dgongs-pa rab-gsal, Vol. Ma, Tashilhunpo ed., f. 167b; Peking ed., V.154, 63,2,4-8.

39. Arnheim, p.42.

40. Cf. Neisser; Gurwitsch, "Some Aspects and Developments of Gestalt Psychology," in his Studies, pp.3-55.

41. Arnheim, pp.11-12. Note the importance of the part-whole relation in Gurwitsch's theory of the perceptual noema; see his _Studies_, pp.346-7.

42. Merleau-Ponty, p.214.

43. See above chap. II, note 15.

44. See May, _Prasannapadā_, pp.153-4, etc.

45. ibid. p.155, 380.

46. See _Madhyamakakārikā_, XVIII,5.

47. See above p.76.

48. See, for example, _Crisis_, p.212.

49. Cf. Martin Heidegger, _Identity and Difference_, trans. J. Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p.29ff.

50. See Martin Heideger, _Being and Time_, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 189.

51. See T. Kisiel, "The Logic of Scientific Discovery," in D. Carr and E. Casey, _Explorations in Phenomenology_ (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973).

52. Cf. Mi-pham, _mKhas-'jug_, f.12a,5; _Abhidharmakośa_ I,5d; _Vyākhyā_ of Yaśomitra, ed. U. Wogihara (Tokyo: Sankibo, 1971), p.15,7: "avakāśaṃ dadātīti akāśam."

53. Peking ed., Vol. 99, 259,4,1-5,1.

54. H.V. Guenther, trans., _Buddhist Philosophy_, pp.104-105.

55. _MAl_, Sa 61a,7-62a,8.

56. _MAl_, Sa 62b,7.

57. _MAl_, Sa 63a5; 63a,8.

58. Cf. the critique of the rnam-rdzun-pa in BCA IX,26-29.

59. PV III, 356c-d.

60. MAl, Sa 63b,2-65a,4.

61. MAl, Sa 112b,7-113a,4.

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV: MAJOR ISSUES OF THE MADHYAMAKĀLAMKĀRA: HOW TO JUMP OVER ONE'S OWN SHADOW

According to Mi-pham, major issues four and five are:

"4. The division of the ultimate into two: discursive and non-discursive;

5. The understanding that there is no contradiction regarding the object of each valid means of knowledge in the situation of setting forth the discursively-formulated ultimate (i.e., that there is necessarily no contention between the assertions of each of the two truths)."[1]

The first three issues have dealt with the text's specific conception of conventional truth, while issues four and five deal with the ultimate truth and its relation to the conventional. In his discussion of the Svātantrika division of the ultimate truth into two, Mi-pham focuses on the problem of śūnyatā as a non-implicative negation (med-dgag, prasajya-pratiṣedha), and the universal Madhyamaka concern not to remain in the more subtle position of negation (i.e., more subtle than affirmation) and thereby hypostatize śūnyatā. Mi-pham quotes the famous texts of Nāgārjuna and Śāntideva on this matter.[2] This is the problem of how to jump over one's own shadow, the shadow of negation. It is reltively easy to negate the essential existence of entities, and it can even become an intellectual game.

Two points should be noted here in regard to this issue of negation in the Madhyamaka. First, affirmation and negation are not mere devices for propositional affirmation and denial. The Mādhyamika is concerned with their ontological significance, with their phenomenological genesis within experience. For affirmation is rooted in the idea of Being as a permanent "presence-at-hand", in the "obsessive concern with particular existents since beginningless time."[3] Negation is bound up with the experience of the absence of this presence. A commentator on Heidegger brings this out:[4]

> "Self-awareness and consciousness of the articulable structures of third personal being must arise simultaneously in the negating discrimination of presence and absence: 'here, not there; then, not now.' This occurs originally, as the reactive interplay of sensory flux and autonomic psychomotor response is at least partially superseded and transformed into the intentionally active interplay of projective-anticipatory performance and re-cognition of consequent and subsequent phenomena as presenting or withholding something proposed or expected.... Negation, then, is only secondarily a formal-logical operation or syncategorematic particle; primarily it is the simultaneous discovery of the absence of the intended and of the difference between the intending being and what it intends."

This brings us to the second point, which is closely allied to the first. How are we to negate this beginningless obsession with the ontic, yet not be left with a mere absence, but be released into the openness of Being (*śūnyatā*)? The point stressed by Mi-pham is that the jumping over the shadow of negation is the entry into (the letting oneself into) the unity (*zung-'jug*) of the two truths. This point is the

basis for Mi-pham's understanding of the relation of the Svātantrikas to the Prāsangikas. The Svātantrika is the approach of the beginner who negates particular existents, "from the ultimate point of view," which experientially represents the discernment (prajñā) of the post-meditative phase (rjes-thob) of Mādhyamika cultivation. This is articulated in the discursively-formulated ultimate. That is, the Svātantrika bases himself on the initial separation of the two truths, opening up this distinction, setting forth the sphere of each.

As for the Prāsangika, Mi-pham states:[5]

> "This aspect of adhering to the separation of the two truths is the special object of negation of the Prāsangikas... Therefore, as long as one still is involved with apprehending activity ('dzin-pa) and has not brought into one-valuedness (ro-gcig-tu ma-gyur) the two truths, one has still not gone beyond the sphere of operation of the dichotomizing intellect.... Because of this the Prāsangikas from the very start set forth the non-discursive (spros-bral) unity of the two truths." (emphasis mine)

This conception of the Prāsangikas has important consequences for Mi-pham. Not only does it experientially represent the originary awareness (jñāna) of the phase of meditative composure (mnyam-bzhag) of Mādhyamika cultivation and an advance over the beginner's approach, but it offers the possibility of a more 'rapid' approach. Mi-pham states in his mKhas-'jug:[6]

> "The Mādhyamikas, who are those who deny essential existence, claim that since all entities, such as the psycho-physical constituents, are present without their essential existence being established, they are open. (They) non-implicatively negate any

establishing of (entities) which can withstand a critique by a logical inquiry from the ultimate standpoint. Presence in contextual origination and such an openness, which are present as a single non-contradictory reality, are the very Being of particular existents. (This) is the perspective of Nāgārjuna, the Great Madhyamaka, the unity of presence and openness. While this is the final intent of the Buddhas, there are different internal divsions within this perspective, such as the manner of affirming the conventional and the gradual and all-at-once approaches to understanding (this final intent)."

This last sentence refers to the division into Prāsangikas and Svātantrikas, and the commentator, mKhan-po nus-ldan, informs us that "gradual" refers to the Svātantrikas, and "all-at-once" to the Prāsangikas.[7] This distinction of "gradual" and "all-at-once" should not be confused with the "gradual vs. sudden Enlightenment" controversy of early Tibet, but refers to the possibility of negating all four extremes of the catuṣkoṭi all at once. Here Mi-pham appears to heark back to Go-rams-pa bsod-nams senge (1429-89), the Sa-skya-pa master who polemicized against Tsong-kha-pa's formulation of the dbu-ma'i lta-ba.[8] But one should also note here Mi-pham's rNying-ma-pa background in the rDzogs-chen, whose philosophy epitomizes an 'all-at-once' approach in its doctrines of "initial purity" (ka-dag), etc. Mi-pham explicitly sets forth this connection between the Prāsangika and the rDzogs-chen in the introduction to the dbu-ma rgyan:[9]

"The intent of Candrakīrti (is) the profound perspective in which the deceptiveness of conventionality subsides in the continuum of Being (dbyings-su yal-ba), because all presence is pure in exactly its own place (rang-sar). (This) is similar to the setting forth

of the initially pure in the works of the rDzogs-chen."

All of this, however, should not lead one to conclude the inferiority of the Svātantrika approach. The Svātantrika does go on from the discursively-formulated ultimate of the beginner to the non-discursive ultimate which is no different from that of the Prāsangika. For just as the conventional and the ultimate, the phases of meditative composure and post-concentration, etc., are a unity, so are the Prāsangika and Svātantrika in their ultimate intent:[10]

> "Since he (Śāntarakṣita) follows the tradition which explains the discursively-formulated ultimate, which accepts independently-formulated syllogisms and the existence of particular existents conventionally, he is counted as an ācārya of the Svātantrikas. Do not think that this is inferior to the Prāsangika perspective. (This is so) because, having made such a division in the general Mahāyāna way which is the unity of these two approaches, there is no difference whatsoever in the essential harmony in the non-abiding continuum which is the unity of the two truths."

As mentioned in the Introduction, Mi-pham was concerned to present this kind of understanding of the relation of the two approaches, which from his point of view had become eroded by centuries of Prāsangika dominance, particularly that of the dGe-lugs-pa.[11] Of importance here is the matter of the dgag-bya, that which is to be negated by the Prāsangika's non-implicative negation, referred to in Mi-pham's commentary on verses 71-72a-b of the MAl.[12] What is to be negated is the essential existence (svabhāva, rang-bzhin)

or existence in truth (bden-grub) of particular existents, not particular existents 'per se.' This distinction was made in order to avoid the extreme of annihilationism; was it not the concept of *svabhāva* that Nāgārjuna was attacking throughout the *Mulamadhyamakakārikā*?[13] A most concise critique of this approach is found in the *lTa-grub shan-'byed* of mDo-sngags bstan-pa'i nyi-ma (sPo-ba sprul sku, 1900-?), a disciple of Kun-bzang dpal-ldan, who was a leading disciple of Mi-pham. The *lTa-grub shan-'byed* is a discussion of difficult philosophical points from the rNying-ma-pa perspective, based on the teachings of Mi-pham (as mentioned above, Mi-pham gave the rNying-ma-pa a voice, as it were, in the scholastic commentarial tradition). mDo-sngags states:[14]

> "Even at the level of a critique from the ultimate point of view, it is said that 'a pot is not devoid of a pot but is devoid of truth-status as a pot (bum-pa bum-pas mi-stong bum-pa bden-pas stong),' and it is also said that 'one must refute the truth status which is founded on this (pot) while not refuting the pot as that which is under consideration (chos-can).' By this method, even the ultimate which is the object of valid knowledge (becomes) a mere discursively-formulated ultimate as a negative abstraction (dngos-med) similar to the explanation of the Svātantrikas. One is in no way able to establish the non-discursive ultimate, the great sameness of presence and openness which is spoken of as 'unconditioned, sheer lucency, non-discursiveness, profound calm.'"

In other words, this approach threatens to reduce the Madhyamaka to a "conceptual analysis," and indeed a great deal of contemporary scholarship has arisen interpreting Nāgārjuna in terms of analytic and ordinary language philosophy.[15]

But the distinction between a thing and its 'nature' (*sva-bhāva*) is a purely conceptual one; mDo-sngags, however, points out that this approach is similar to that of the Svātantrikas, and hence is a valuable one for the beginner.

Mi-pham extensively discusses issues four and five as follows:

"4. The division into the two aspects of the ultimate, discursive and non-discursive: the division into a discursively-formulated and non-discursive ultimate is a good procedure which makes (this approach) very superior. That is, if one did not, only in the beginning, teach (the ultimate) as non-existence in truth, there would be no means for removing the errant appropriation of particular existents which has been habituated to since beginningless time. But if one teaches merely this as the ultimate, people of little intelligence, thinking that the presence of Being is a mere negation which negates what is to be negated, will generate the philosophical view which is unable to cure obsession with *śūnyatā*. In this obsessive approach there are two forms of obsession with regard to *śūnyatā*: as a particular existent and as a negative abstraction (*dngos-med*). But if one
f.56 just says, 'It is not suitable to be involved with any extreme whatsoever,' one throws out the certainty of understanding (*nges-shes*) which gives rise to,

through logical investigation, the source of the elixir of the profound openness which is the antidote to the multifarious epidemic of projective existence. If one says, 'It is not proper to harbor anything in one's mind (yid-la byas),' one has entered into the darkest darkness in which there is no mindful inspection (dran-pa). In such cases it is difficult to experience, or to think about and see, this profound teaching (dharma). As the Madhyamakaśāstra states:[16]

> 'If śūnyatā if wrongly envisaged it will destroy those of little intelligence, just like a snake wrongly handled or a mantra wrongly employed. Therefore, the mind (thugs) of the Sage was dissuaded from teaching his message (chos), having realized the difficulty that those of weak (intellect) would have in fathoming this profound message.'

Therefore, having first destroyed obsession with particular existents by this discursively-formulated ultimate, subsequently, through the teaching of the non-discursive ultimate, one removes the aspect of obsession with this (conception of śūnyatā in the discursively-formulated ultimate) as a negative abstraction. In brief, in not adhering to any distinctions whatsoever, such as the truth-status of any of the four extremes of existence, non-existence, both, and neither, it is necessary to apprehend quickly the profound significance, which is to make an individual experience of (so-so rang-gis rig-par bya-ba) the

great non-discursiveness which destroys these objectifications. One should know these approaches as Śāntideva has said:[17]

> 'By accustoming oneself to the ingrained tendency of openness, one will eliminate the tendency of particular existents. Eventually even accustoming oneself to 'There is nothing whatsoever' will be eliminated.
> When one cannot represent a particular existent to be investigated as 'that which is non-existent,' then how can non-existence (as an abstraction), being without a support, remain before the intellect.
> When neither particular existents nor their negation (as an abstraction) remain before the intellect, then, since there is no other possibility, (discursiveness) is pacified, there being nothing objectifiable.'

f.57 Now, since it is impossible to think of another (alternative) apart from the four extremes, when one has negated the four extremes, one may think: what difference is there with the approach of the Hva-Shang of not harboring anything in mind (yid-la mi byed-pa)? (The reply is:) in the case of the Hva-Shang, etc., rejecting all obsession with particular existents and not observing any objectified characteristics whatsoever, is not (true) non-categorization (yid-la mi-byed-pa). How can a mere negation of all movement in the mind eliminate all extremes? In that there is no basis for eliminating even the extreme of existence, (true) non-categorization is not like this. One should understand (this) according to the method of instruction which is not mixed up with the five

worldly forms of non-categorization, and so forth, as the _Dharmadharmatāvibhāga_ states:[18]

> 'Non-categorization, transcendence, pseudo-quiescence, non-conceptualization, and adhering to an indication of the real, are the five aspects whose elimination characterizes (non-conceptualizing originary awareness).'

Although it acts as an antidote to obsession with existence when one accustoms oneself to the stance of non-existence through a logical critique, since one has not given up objectifying non-existence (as an abstraction), how can this be the genuine originary awareness which thoroughly understands openness and non-discursiveness? Some say that adherence to non-implicative negation (_med-dgag_) which negates existence in truth is called the viewpoint of annihilationism, just as in the case of adherence to particular existents.[19] But, since the viewpoint of annihilationism is known as the dismissal of cause and result, how could this (adherence to non-implicative negation) be the annihilationist perspective? Since it is in accord with the standpoint which is an antidote to adherence to existence in truth, then just like impermanence and unpleasantness, etc., it is indeed to be cultivated by beginners. But if one compares it to the reality of non-conceptualizing originary awareness, the Great Middle which is free from all positing and viewpoints, it is very inferior,

since it is a viewpoint of negation which is essentially characterized by conceptualization.

f.58 Further, although mere negation which negates what is to be negated in the case of the beginner, is able to appear as an object for the intellect, for a person who has gone to the essential point of the Madhyamaka critique through properly distinguishing between a mere negation and absence of essential existence (*rang-bzhin med*), the specific stance of certainty in understanding the indivisibility in reality of contextual origination and absence of essential existence is indeed the antidote which removes the two extremes of eternalism and annihilationism which are like an abyss. As long as one has the standpoint of affirmation and negation, then it is not that which is free from the four extremes, the discursiveness of conceptualization. By settling (*mnyam-par bzhag-pas*), through originary awareness, into the *dharmadhātu* which has been elicited by the certainty of understanding which determines by reasoning that there is no abiding in any of the four extremes, one is able to exclude all the extremes of discursiveness. From this comes confidence in the calm reality of non-categorization, which is explained in the *Prajñāpāramitā* (literature) as the ultimate limit (*yang-dag mtha'*) in which there is nothing to be gained and

which cuts off imputations.

As to the ultimate presence of Being which is the concern of meditative composure (mnyam-bzhag), since there is no standpoint of the four extremes (in it) and it is not an object of thought or language, one can't even make a claim about it. Yet, while a standpoint exists, (mere) non-affirmation is a viewpoint which is deceitful and dishonest. Although the mere (fact of) non-affirmation in these two (i.e., in the case of genuine realization and in the case of those who merely make no claims) are similar, in reality there is a distinction between truth and falsehood. It is like not accepting that one who is not a thief steals, as opposed to not accepting that a thief steals.

Further, by the subsequent certainty regarding the skillfulness which understands this very meaning which is the concern of meditative composure, one
f.59 utilizes linguistic symbols. When one makes statements through utilizing names such as unoriginated, without essential existence, openness, free from discursiveness, unobjectifiable, free from extremes, etc., ... in reality, these words are taught for the sake of removing all the spheres of operation of objectification and assertion. For example, the words which affirm, 'Since I have no thesis,' and, 'The originary

awareness of a Buddha is not an object of speech or thought,' are spoken for the sake of refuting that there exists a thesis, or that (originary awareness) is an object of speech or thought. This being so, as in the case where (someone) looks at the finger and not at the moon when one points out the moon by a finger, stupid people obsessed with words, think, on account of (expressions such as) 'expressing the unexpressible, thinking the unthinkable, and affirming non-affirmation,' that these words are contradictory, as in the case of the Cārvākas who asserted that inference was not a valid means of knowledge. This is very wrong. And just as this is extremely incorrect, in this case also it is very important to understand the single important point in which no contradiction is to be found, of making a conventional expression which points out the meaning which is inexpressible and asserting by words which are apprehended with certainty, the meaning of non-assertion. So, by words such as unoriginated, one demonstrates that the various spheres of objectifying activity are 'open' (stong), and since one has countered obsession to these entities which are 'open' as something (objectifiable), non-objectification is unquestionably
f.60,5 demonstrated.... Therefore, how could the profound Prajñāpāramitā in which no objectifying standpoint

whatsoever exists, be similar to the Hva-Shang? Freedom from the discursiveness of the four extremes does not fall under the positions of existence and non-existence, and although one is not able to point it out as it is by words and concepts apart from the sphere of operation of each one's consciousness, in words which point to it, it is known as 'The Middle which is the unity of the two truths, or the indivisibility of presence and openness.'....

f.61,3 One should generate certainty in the path of reasoning which unites the two truths, the method which understands unerringly the essential point of this teaching. First, (one should) set forth all presences as open, and then develop a trusting conviction in the manner in which openness is present as contextual origination. Then, having relied on the method which unites openness and contextual origination in which presence is openness and openness is presence, make an experience of, through the method of non-experience, this releasement from discursiveness, i.e., utter Sameness (mnyam-pa nyid). In this, the releasement from all extremes through what is spoken of as the (divisions of śūnyatā[20]), such as the openness of openness (which is spoken of) in order to negate obsession with a negative abstraction which is thereby refuted and external openness (which

is spoken of) in order to refute obsession with (the extreme of) existence, is the non-discursively formulated ultimate. In regard to this, the Svātantrikas at first for a while adhere to the discursively-formulated ultimate through the power of the intellect. Because one has been deceived in projective existence by this apprehension of particular existents whose object is not genuine, ultimately, the subjective mode of apprehension of a non-implicative negation which thinks, 'There is no establishment of essential existence whatsoever,' is taken as of great value....

f.62,6 This aspect of adhering to the separation of the two truths is the special object of refutation of the Prāsangikas.... Therefore, as long as one still has apprehending acts and has not brought into one-valuedness the two truths, one has still not gone beyond the sphere of operation of the dichotomizing intellect. Because of this one has not obtained the non-dichotomizing originary awareness, the real Prajñāpāramitā which is free from the two forms of imputation (i.e., positive and negative). Because of this the Prāsangikas from the very beginning set forth non-discursively the unity of the two truths. Since they have refuted by reasoning that aspect of adherence (to the separation of the two truths) which thinks that there exists an establishment (of entities) by defining characteris-

tics merely conventinally although not established in truth, they have destroyed adherence to the distinction in which the two truths exist each in its own sphere, and (thus) combine the two truths into a single value. By this, all modes of subjective apprehensions which apprehend existence and non-existence, etc., will be destroyed. Thus, in this approach, the obsessive objects of the four extremes have been closed off such that it is not necessary to make a distinction between the two truths as separate, such as the ultimate (truth) and the establishment in truth of the four extremes. Because of this, the final presence of Being, the great openness which is free from all affirmations and objectifications of the subjective intellect, is spoken of in regard to its accord with originary awareness, the noble meditative composure. But in the post-concentration phase (rjes-thob) it is very important to accept that all aspects of the path and the goal are set forth unerringly according to how they are validated by the valid means of knowledge for the two truths....

f.64,1 In this treatise of the scholar (Śāntarakṣita), at first, having established the two methods by which stainless discernment (prajñā) separately dimarcates the two truths, then, finally, having eliminated even adherence to the separateness of the two truths in the

great non-discursive ultimate, and by having set forth freedom from all assertions in accord with non-dichotomizing originary awareness (in the phase of) meditative composure, the ultimate intent of these two traditions (gzhung) is the same without distinction.... Therefore, ascertaining completely (rtsal-du bton-nas) the discursively-formulated ultimate which involves assertions, characterizes the Svātantrikas, while ascertaining completely the non-discursive ultimate which is free from assertions, should be known (to characterize) the Prāsangikas...

f.65,2 Thus, in this Ornament of the Madhyamaka of the great scholar, by combining the meaning of the Svātantrikas and the Prāsangikas, it is an ornament to the whole Madhyamaka. Therefore, one should know that the Svātantrikas and the Prāsangikas are the way to completely ascertain originary awareness which is the one-valuedness of the two truths in the phase of meditative composure and discerning awareness which discriminates the two truths separately in the post-composure phase....

f.67,3 5. That there is necessarily no contention between the assertions of each of the two truths: since the originary awareness of meditative composure is free from speech and its intentionality (smra bsam brjod-pa dang bral-ba), it is beyond the objects of language

and conception. One is unable to comprehend such an originary awareness as long as one has not properly given rise to the stainless discernment which is the means of discerning the two truths. Yet, while the Noble Ones have comprehended (this originary awareness), in the post-concentration phase, although all the aspects of affirmation and negation, such as exists, doesn't exist, is, is not, have not passed beyond the sphere of operation of language and conception, they can (still) speak in advising others, instructing, debating, etc. Because they speak having investigated with discernment which discriminates entities unerringly without mixing things up, i.e., 'such is existent, such is non-existent,' they are able to demarcate unerringly the genuine conventional which establishes by reasoning, without exception, the affirmation and negation regarding all of the path and the goal, and the cause and result of action. And,
f.68 having based themselves on obtaining the eye of analytical discernment which discriminates, without exception, the aspects of the knowable, they become empowered with the eye of originary awareness which directly sees the reality of utter Sameness which is free from all discursiveness.

Moreover, having come under the sway of the knowledge which validates (_'jal-ba_) the non-discursive

ultimate which is free from the discursiveness of the four extremes, the utter Sameness of presence and openness, they have refuted the establishment of of the relative through a defining characteristic even conventionally, since this only involves divisive conceptualization which adheres to the separateness of the two truths. Yet, if one remains within the mere negation of the discursively-formulated ultimate, one will never be able to refute the establishment of the relative through a defining characteristic, which is the meaning obtained by conventional means of knowledge. But having made a refutation (of the conventional), if one cultivates a mere negation, one falls into partiality concerning the two truths, and because one engages in negative imputation regarding the aspect of presence, it is similar to the method and basic texts of the bsam gtan dad-pa bdun,[21] a cultivation in which even the relative is non-existent, like the Cārvākas. Having this in mind, the Yid-bzhin rin-po-che'i mdzod also states:[22]

> 'A nihilistic nothing which doesn't understand this approach although it mouths the words, 'free from the extremes of existence and non-existence,' (is just) a worldy view which does not understand the basis for freedom. Since one becomes an outsider from this teaching, one should smear oneself with ashes like the Cārvākas.'

The method of giving rise to freedom from discursiveness of the four extremes in one's existence by stainless genuine reasoning, in the situation of the gradual understanding of the beginner, (is as follows): at first one rejects involvement with objectification (*zhen-yul*), which apprehends the existence of particular existents in regard to all conditioned and unconditioned entities. Subsequently, having refuted involvement with objectification regarding the remaining three (extremes) of non-existence, etc., by suitably cultivating the special certainty which does not abide in the objects of involvement of each of the extremes, one will obtain
f.69 the luminous presence of the *dharmadhātu*, having refuted all at once all the extremes of discursiveness without (going through them) in turn. As Kun-mkhyen bsod-nams senge said:[23]

> 'Although intelligent ordinary people who investigate the presence of Being, can't refute the four extremes of discursiveness all at once, having refuted the four in turn, when they enter the Path of Seeing having cultivated properly, (they will) produce the perspective which conventionally speaking sees the *dharmadhātu*.'" [24]

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla do not use the terms "discursively-formulated ultimate" and "non-discursive ultimate" (*rnam-grangs pa'i don-dam*, *rnam-grangs ma-yin-pa'i don-dam*), which had been introduced by Bhāvaviveka, who himself did not regularly employ these terms when making this division

of the ultimate truth.[25] Śāntarakṣita's presentation in verses 69-72 and Mi-pham's extensive discussion of this theme, are merely restatements, according to the needs and language of their times, of the famous verses of Nāgārjuna (quoted by Śāntarakṣita in his auto-commentary on verse 72):[26]

> "If a particular existent were established, then
> a negative abstraction could be established,
> Since people call what is other than a particular
> existent an abstraction.
> Those who perceive essential existence, conditioned
> existence, particular existents, and abstractions,
> Do not truly perceive the Buddha's teaching."

Śāntarakṣita states:

> "Therefore, ultimately no particular existent can
> be established.
> On account of this the Tathāgatas have said that
> all entities do not come into being.//69
>
> Ultimately one cannot accept even the subtlest particular existent as completely established, since by this method we have demonstrated freedom from essential unitariness and multiplicity. Therefore, ultimately, how can that which originates, abides, decays, as well as any other entity based on this, exist?....[27] Although non-origination, etc., are included in the genuine conventional,
>
> Since it is in accord with the ultimate reality,
> it is called 'ultimate reality.'
> In the ultimate sense, the (genuine ultimate) is

freedom from the whole mass of linguistic proliferation.//70

The ultimate has eliminated the whole net of linguistic proliferation, such as _śūnya_ and _aśūnya_, origination and non-origination, particular existent and (negative) abstraction. Since non-origination, etc. is in accord with understanding this (ultimate truth), it is designated, 'ultimate.' (As it is said:)[28]

> 'Without the ladder of that which is ultimately valid conventionally,
> It would be impossible to know how to proceed to the upper story of the ultimate.'

Why? To show directly the ultimate:

Since there is no origination, etc., non-origination, etc., are impossible.
On account of the refutation of the factuality of these, (even) linguistic expressions for these are impossible.//71
There doesn't exist a proper application of a negation to a non-existent object.
In that it relies on divisive conceptualization, (this negation) partakes of the conventional and not the ultimate.//72

If origination, etc. are non-existent, one can't accept the application of linguistic expressions (to them). Therefore, on account of this refutation in which the object doesn't exist, because origination

does not exist, non-origination, etc. are impossible. Although a defining characteristic is not an object of these expressions, dichotomous conceptualization which has come about from habituating tendencies since beginningless time, appropriates (them) as an apparent object.... Since it is based on the conceptualizing intellect which is called 'conventional,' non-origination, etc., are conventional and not ultimate, like the term 'tree,' etc."[29]

Notes to Chapter IV

1. See above p. 27.

2. See below pp. 107, 108.

3. See below pp. 106, 163.

4. Starr, p.207.

5. See below p. 114.

6. Mi-pham, mKhas-'jug, f.134a.

7. mKhan-po nus-ldan, mKhas pa'i tshul-la 'jug-pa'i sgo'i mchan-'grel legs-bshad snang-ba'i 'od-zer (Delhi: Lama Jurme Drakpa, 1974), f.591,5.

8. See below note 23.

9. UG, f.46,3-4.

10. ibid. f.46,1-3.

11. For Tsong-kha-pa's position, see above Introduction, note 25.

12. UG, f.262,5ff.

13. For a presentation of this understanding of the MMK, see Ives Waldo, "Nāgārjuna and analytic philosophy," PEW, 25, no.3 (1975), 281-90.

14. lTa-grub shan-'byed gnad-kyi sgron-me yi tshig-don rnam-bshad 'jam-dbyangs dgongs-brgyan, xylograph, n.p., n.d., f.24a.

15. See, for example, note 13 above, and Chris Gudmunsen, Wittgenstein and Buddhism (London: Macmillan, 1977).

16. MMK, XXIV,11-12.

17. BCA, IX,32-4.

18. "The Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga and the Dharmadharmatā-vibhaṅga-vṛtti," ed. J. Nozawa, in Studies in Indology and Buddhology Presented in Honor of Prof. Susumu Yamaguchi on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday (Kyoto: Hozokan, 1955), pp. 37-8. Cf. MS VIII,2.

19. Here Mi-pham appears to be defending Tsong-kha-pa against some of his harsher critics, such as Go-ram-pa, who relegated Tsong-kha-pa to a "Nihilistic Madhyamaka" in his lTa-ba'i shan-'byed theg-mchog gnad-kyi zla-zer, in the Sa-skya bka'-'bum, ed. bSod-nams rgya-mtsho (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1976), Vol. 13, pp.1-24.

20. On the divisions of śūnyatā, see Lamotte's exhaustive study in his Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, Tome IV, Publications de L'Institute Orientaliste de Louvain, No.12 (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1976), pp.1995-2151.

21. I have not been able to identify these texts.

22. Klong-chen rab-'byams-pa, Theg-pa chen-po'i man ngag-gi bstan-bcos yid-bzhin rin-po-che'i mdzod-kyi 'grel-pa pad-ma dkar-po, ed. Dodrup Chen Rinpoche (Gangtok, n.d.), f. 811.

23. Go-ram-pa, lTa-ba'i shan-'byed, f.46b. Mi-pham also appears to paraphrase this work several places in his

writings. See below Appendix 3, note 8.

24. UG, f.55,4-69,2.

25. Cf., for example Tarkajvālā, Peking ed., Vol.96, 27,5,6-8.

26. MMK, XV,5-6.

27. Kamalaśīla adds (Sa 126a,7):

> "If one asks: since origination, etc. are conceptual constructs (kun-tu btags-pa), the origination, etc. of particular existents is not accepted; then how is it that the Bhagavan, in statements such as, 'Non-origination is true,' stated that non-origination is the very truth (bden-pa nyid)? (Śāntarakṣita) replies, 'Althought non-origination, etc.'"

The first half of verse 70 is an explanation of the term, paramārtha (don-dam).

28. Tarkajvālā III,12. See below p. 164.

29. MAl, Sa 70a,4-72a,1.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1

The *Madhyamakālaṃkārakārikā* of Śāntarakṣita

1. These particular existents spoken of by ourselves and others are without essential existence,
Because they are ultimately neither unitary nor multiple,
Like a mirror-image.

2. Since results are gradually produced, those entities which are said to be (an) eternal (cause) are not of a unitary nature.
If results are each (produced) gradually (by various causes), the eternality of these (entities) would be destroyed.

3. Even according to the approach of those who speak of the unconditioned as an object of knowledge for a cognition which arises out of meditation, it is not a unitary (entity),
Because these (unconditioned entities) would be related to a cognition which has phases (of before and after).

4. If the essential existence (of an unconditioned entity) known by a previous cognition, were (also known by) a succeeding (cognition),
Then, just as a previous cognition could become subsequent, a subsequent (cognition) could become previous (because their object is unconditioned).

5. If the essential existence of this (unconditioned entity) does not come about in the former and later phases (of cognition),
Then the unconditioned, like cognition, should be understood to be momentary.

6. If by virtue of the previous moment (of the unconditioned, the subsequent moments) would come about,
It wouldn't be unconditioned, just like mind and mental events.

7. If you claim that these momentary (unconditioned objects) come about by virtue of themselves,
Then, since they are not dependent on another, they will always be either existent or non-existent.

8. Why do you postulate these (eternal objects) as existing when they are not efficacious?
What's the use of a man seeking sexual gratification, asking whether a frigid woman is good-looking or not? [1]

9. Since it is not possible to demonstrate a personhood which is not the momentary (psycho-physical constituents),
One should know clearly that it is neither unitary nor multiple.

10. How can these pervasive entities be a unitary whole, since they are related to (objects) with various aspects?
Since particular existents can be covered or not covered, etc., macroscopic entities are not an undivided whole.

11. (Ultimate particles) can be joined (to each other), arranged around each other (without being joined), or placed next to each other without interval.
The central particle essentially (must) face another particle (in some direction).[2]

12. If it is claimed that the other particles facing (it) are just like this (unidirectional particle),
Then, in such a case, in what way could (the particles of) water, earth, etc., be built up?[3]

13. If the side (of a central particle) which faces other particles is claimed to be (something) other,
Then, how would such an ultimate particle be a partless, unitary whole.[4]

14. Since it is established that ultimate particles are without essential existence,
Then, all (the entities according to) ourselves and others, such as the eye and substance, are obviously without essential existence.

15. The essential existence of this (ultimate particle), what is built up from this, its qualities, its activity, and even its universality and particularity,
Are (claimed to be) combinations of these (ultimate particles).

16. Perception comes about (characteristially) contrary to that which is insentient.
That which is essentially not insentient is the reflexivity of the noetic.[5]

17. Since one cannot accept that that which is partless and unitary is three-fold,
The reflexivity of this (noesis) is not itself a particular existent which is divided into an agent and an object of activity.[6]

18. Therefore, because this is the essential existence of the noetic, it is the very being of the noetic.
How can that which is other (than the noetic) which has the essential existence of an object, become known by this (partless) noesis (since there would be no relation between them)?[7]

19. If the essential existence of this (noesis) does not exist in what is other (i.e., objects), how could this

(noesis) know another (object in the same way it is reflexively) noetic,
Since it is claimed (by you) that the knower and the known are separate entities.[8]

20. In the case of (those who say) that the noesis possesses a perceptual noema although these two are really separate,
Since (the intended object and the perceptual noema) are like (an object and its) mirror image, (the intended object) is merely postulated as a felt experience.[9]

21. In the case of those who do not claim perception to be "colored" by the perceptual noema of the intended object,
There wouldn't even exist the (noetic) aspect which cognizes the intended object.[10]

22. Since there is no difference between the unitary noesis (and its noema, according to this view), there wouldn't be a multiplicity of perceptual noemata.
Therefore, one couldn't posit that there would be noeses (intending) intended objects by virtue of this multiplicity.[11]

23. Since perception would not be differentiable from the perceptual noemata (according to you, since noemata are multiple, the noesis) would no longer be a unity.

If this is not so, how could these two (noesis and noema) be called a "unity."[12]

24. The noeses (intending) white, etc., come about gradually (in perceiving a multi-colored object),
But since they come about in quick succession, stupid people think of them as perceived simultaneously.

25. Since the intellectual apprehensions of the sound la-tā, etc., come about in quick succession,
Even in this case, (apprehensions) should come about simultaneously; why doesn't it happen like this?[13]

26. Even purely intellectual apprehensions couldn't be known to come about in succession (in this case).
Since they do not remain for any length of time, all of these apprehensions would be indistinguishable in their rapid succession.[14]

27. Therefore, in regard to all the objects (of apprehension), although they wouldn't be gradually apprehended,
The seeming variety of perceptual noemata would appear as apprehended simultaneously.[15]

28. Also, in the case of the whirling fire-brand, (although) there arises the error of it appearing simultaneously

as a circle,

Since, when seen, it is present quite clearly, there are no intervals (of earlier and later moments to be connected) by sight.[16]

29. That is, the connecting of intervals would be done by memory-retention and not vision,

Since the latter cannot apprehend a past object.[17]

30. That which is the object of this (memory-retention) would not be clearly (perceived) since it is past.

For this reason, this presence as a circle (in the case of the whirling fire-brand) would not be clearly (perceived).[18]

31. At the time of seeing a single painting, we (call it a) whole,

In claiming that many intentions corresponding to their (objects) come about together.

32. If this is so, although a noesis (intends) a single perceptual noema of white, etc,

Since (the perceptual noema) has various (parts) such as upper, middle, and edge, it would become various possible objects.

33. An atomistic white, etc., that is partless and unitary:

A noesis for which this is present is not experienced by oneself.

34. The five perceptual functions have (each their) perceptual noemata cognized as aggregates (of ultimate particles).
The cognition of mind and mental events is taken as the sixth.

35. Even in the basic texts of the outsiders, perception doesn't appear as a unitary whole,
Since it is apprehended as substance, etc., which is composed of qualities, etc.

36. Like the essence of a brilliant jewel, (so are) all particular existents (one in their essence, according to the the Jains and Mīmāṃsakas)
But even according to this view, the mind which apprehends these (objects) cannot be understood to appear as unitary.

37. Even in the system of (the Lokāyatas) who claim that all the sensory modalities and their objects are conglomerations of earth, etc.,
There is no harmonious organization into a unitary particular existent.

38. Even in the position (of the Sāṃkhya) in which sound, etc.

are in their nature <u>sattva</u>, etc.

The noetic which possesses a single object makes no sense, since the apparent object has a triple nature.

39. While the nature of a particuar existent has three aspects, if the (perception of it) appears as a unity,

And if the apparent (aspect) is different from this (object), how can you claim this (perception) apprehends this object?

40. Although there are no external objects, there are a variety of appearances (before a consciousness which is) eternal (according to the Vedānta).

(In this case,) it is very difficult to harmonize the aspect of gradual origination with the aspect of unitariness.

41. The noeses (which intend) space, etc., are present as mere names.

Since they are made up of many letters, it is clear they are multiple.

42. Although one takes a perception which appears without various (intended objects) as existing,

Still it cannot be taken (as being) really (unitary), since the characteristic (of unitariness) is seen to

be contradictory.

43. Therefore, the perception of what is present in its variety, which remains at all times,
Makes no sense as essentially unitary (although with) seemingly multiple noemata.

44. The noemata which magically appear by the maturation of habituating tendencies since beginningless time,
Although present, through error are like an apparition.

45. This (approach) is a good one, yet (the question remains) are these particular existents real or not.
One must still inquire into the acceptance of what is merely experienced but not investigated.

46. If, ultimately (perception exists), perceptions (corresponding to many noemata) would be multiple. And further,
These (perceptual noemata) would become unitary (since perception is unitary); because these two (unitariness and multiplicity) are contradictory, (perception and noema) would certainly be separate.

47. If (you claim) that these (perceptual noemata) aren't multiple, then, because of the unity of movement and non-movement, etc.,

There would be the absurd consequence that all would move, etc. It is difficult to answer (this objection).

48. If, as in the case of (those who claim) n object-in-itself, (here in the Cittamātra) perceptual noemata are inseparable (from perceptual noeses);
Then, irrefutably everything would become one.

49. But if perception were admitted (by you) to be equal in number to its corresponding perceptual noemata,
Then it would be difficult for you to avoid the critique which was made similarly regarding ultimate particles.

50. If, although (noemata) are various, (the noetic) is unitary, is this not the approach (of the Jains called) Digambaras.
A multiplicity is not unitary, like several gems, etc.

51. If a variety (of noemata) are unitary, then how could there be this multiplicity
Of appearance as various, such as obscured and not obscured?

52. But if in actuality, there didn't exist these perceptual noemata of this (noesis),
Then ultimately they would appear through error for the perception which is without a perceptual noema.

53. If (these noemata) do not exist, how are they experienced clearly?

Such a perceptual noesis which is separate from its (noema) is not (possible).

54. Wherein a particular existent does not exist, therein the knowledge of that (non-existence) does not exist.

Just like happiness in unhappiness, and non-white in white.

55. A perceptual noema cannot be accepted as a concrete object of a noesis,

Since it is (according to you) separate from the very being of the noesis, like a flower in the sky.

56. Since that which does not exist is without the ability (to give rise to perception), even a mere postulation would be impossible, like a hare's horn.

Since there is no (such perceptual noema) there can be no ability to produce a noesis (intending) a real presence.

57. On acount of what would a (noema) exist and its apodictic experience (be present)? How could there be a relation with a noesis?

(Since) there is no real (noema, there is no relation to) a real noesis, and (the noema) doesn't come about from this (noesis).

58. If there is no cause (for the noema), how could it come about at various times?
(A perceptual noema) which is caused, for what reason would it be excluded from contextuality?

59. When there is no (perceptual noema) still (one claims) a perceptual act will be (experienced) without a perceptual noema --
But a noesis which is like a clear crystal is not to be experienced.

60. If one claims that this (noema) is known by virtue of error, how is that (noema) dependent on error?
If it (comes about) through the power of error, this (noema) is then contextual.

61. (When) we investigate each particular existent, these are (found) not to be unitary.
That in which there is no unity, there is also no multiplicity.

62. A particular existent which does not belong to unity or multiplicity is impossible,
Since these two are co-implicates.

63. Therefore, these particular existents have the defining

characteristic of the conventional only.
If one claims that these have an ultimate status, how could they (be refuted) by us?

64. The thematized entities which arise and cease (momentarily) and are enjoyed merely by virtue of not investigating them
Are that which is efficacious. Understand that (this) is the conventional.

65. Although (these entities) are enjoyed merely by virtue of not investigating them,
There arises a similar subsequent result based on its previous causes.

66. Therefore, if the conventional is without a (true) causal basis, then says (the reductionist, its presence) is not possible. This is not so.
If the appropriated basis is real, then say so (with reason).

67. Since this (method of demonstrating) the essential existence of all particular existents following a reasoned inquiry,
Removes the contentions of others, wrong-headed opponents have nowhere to stand.

68. Those who do not accept existence, non-existence, (both and

neither) existence and non-existence
Cannot be attacked at all, even by those eager for (disputation).

69. Therefore, ultimately no particular existent can be established.
On account of this the Tathāgatas have said that all entities do not come into being.

70. Since it is in accord with the ultimate reality, it is called "ultimate reality."
In the ultimate sense, the (genuine ultimate) is freedom from the whole mass of linguistic proliferation.

71. Since there is no origination, etc., non-origination, etc. are impossible.
On account of the refutation of the factuality of these, (even) linguistic expressions for these are impossible.

72. There doesn't exist a proper application of a negation to a non-existent object.
In that it relies on divisive conceptualization, (this negation) partakes of the conventional and not the ultimate.

73. Now, since one thoroughly comprehends this (entity, such

as a pot) because its essential existence is immediately apprehended,
Then how could even ignorant people not understand the mode of being of particular existents?

74. This is not so. Since one's stream of existence has come under the sway of imputing particular existents so heavily since beginningless time,
Those who are attached to life will not realize (the truth) of these particular existents) directly.

75. While this (truth) is understood by those who make sound inferences through the (method of) reasoning which understands (this truth) and eliminates imputation,
Those endowed with yogic insight clearly (see this) directly.

76-78. The existence of (the conventions of) means of proof and what is to be proven regarding particular existents, which are well-known to ordinary woman and children
As well as to learned people who have rejected the diverse thematized entities which have been put forward by the basic texts (of the philosophical systems),
Are (to be) understood correctly without exception.
If this were not so, how could a reply, where a common

ground, etc. is not established, be made?
I do not negate particular existents in their mode of presencing,
Therefore there is no problem (in my) affirming a means of proof and that which is to be proved.

79-81. Therefore, in the continuity of beginningless existences, we infer (the existence) of latencies suitable (to our own),
Of the thematizations of particular existent and abstraction, etc.
These (thematizations) do not arise through the power of particular existents, since these are non-existent.
The absolute reality of these particular existents has been extensively refuted.
Since (presences) come about gradually, they are not purely fortuitous, (and since) they don't come about all the time, they do not (arise from) an eternal (cause).
Therefore, on account of similarity of habituation, a first (moment of a new experience) is born from that which is similar to itself.

82. Therefore, eternalistic and annihilationistic views are for removed from this Madhyamaka approach.
Change and succession (are preserved) as in the case of

seed, shoot, and branch.

83. Those who know that entities are without an ultimate status,
by accustoming themselves to this absence of essential existence,
Will eliminate, without confusion, conflicting emotionality
which arises from wrong-headed notions.

84. Since the particular existents which are cause and result
are not to be discounted conventionally,
Pervasive emotionality and its purification, etc., can be
affirmed without contention.

85. Thus, by affirming the entities which are cause and result,
In this approach the stainless accumulation of merits also
is possible.

86. From pure causes come pure results,
Just as the pure facets of ethical conduct, etc., come
about from a proper perspective.

87. In the same way from impure causes come impure results,
Just as negative behavior, etc., comes about by virtue of
an improper perspective.

88. Since (in the case of the existence of an objectified par-

ticular existent,) there exists a fallacy according to reason,
Like the perception of a mirage, it is a completely false fabrication.

89. Therefore, all the accomplishments of the transcending functions which come about by virtue of this (perspective which still apprehends particular existents),
Just like (the apprehension) of 'I' and 'mine' which arises from a perverted (perspective), are of little power.

90. A tremendous result comes about from non-objectification into particular existents,
Since it comes about from a cause which is developing, just like a shoot from a fertile seed.

91. Although the transformations of causes and result are only the noetic,
That which is self validating is the noetic.

92. Having based oneself on "Experience-only," one should know that an object-in-itself does not exist.
And having based oneself on the method (of this text), one should know that even this (experiencing) is without ultimate status.

93. Those who take hold of the reigns of logical inquiry, having mounted the chariot (of the unity) of these two approaches,
By this take hold of the Mahāyāna itself which is their intent.

94. Viṣṇu and Śiva have not perceived it, and even those who have become the highest in the world,
Have not perceived a cause which is immeasurable.

95. This pure ambrosia which is genuine, is not an enjoyment of others
Who are apart from the Tathāgatas who possess its cause which is pure spiritual responsiveness.

96. Therefore, in regard to those who adhere to wrong-headed teachings,
Those who have entered the way of the (Tathāgatas) should give rise to compassion.

97. Seeing how there is no compassion in other teachings, those who are possessed of the wealth of intelligence,
Should give rise to devotion to the Protector (Buddha).

Notes to Appendix 1

1. =PV I,211, except MAl has de 'dod instead of don gnyer.

2. =Tattvasaṃgraha 1989, ed. D. Shastri (Benares, 1968).

3. =TS 1990

4. =TS 1991

5. =TS 1999

6. =TS 2000.

7. =TS 2001.

8. =TS 2002.

9. =TS 2004.

10. =TS 2005.

11. =TS 2036.

12. =TS 2037.

13. =TS 1250.

14. =TS 1251, =PV III,138c-d.

15. =TS 1252.

16. =TS 1253.

17. =TS 1254.

18. =TS 1255.

Appendix 2

Topical Outline (<u>sa-bcad</u>) of the

<u>dbu-ma rgyan rnam-bshad</u> of Mi-pham

1. Introduction to what is to be explained (2b,5)

2. The meaning of the text to be explained (39b,4)

2.1 The body of the text (39b,4)

2.11 The meaning of the title (39b,5)

2.12 The translator's salutation (41b,4)

2.13 The meaning of the text (42a,1)

2.131 Setting forth the meaning of the Two Truths (which constitute) the knowable (42a,2)

2.1311 Grasping the method (of applying) the Two Truths (42a,2)

2.13111 Demonstrating that ultimately particular existents are non-existent (42a,3)

2.131111 Setting up the basic argument (42a,3) <u>V.1</u>

2.1311111 Examination of the property-possessor (the subject) (42b,2)

2.1311112 Examination of the (means of) proof (43a,5)

2.13111121 Examination of the (means of) proof of the Svātantrikas and the Prāsangikas (43a,6)

2.13111122 Examination of means of proof based on reality and convention (44a,3)

2.13111123 Examination of implicative and non-implicative negation (44b,4)

2.1311113 Explanation of the example (45a,3)

2.131112 Proof of the way in which the basic argument has been

set up (47b,1)

2.1311121 Proof of the property to be proven (47b,1)

2.13111211 Proof that there is no unitariness in truth (47b,2)

2.131112111 Refutation of unitariness of pervasive entities (47b,2)

2.1311121111 Refutation of unitariness in truth of particular pervasive entities (47b,3)

2.13111211111 Refutation of unitariness in truth of an eternal entity (47b,3)

2.131112111111 Refutation of eternal entities postulated by other systems (47b,2) V.2

2.131112111112 Refutation of eternal entities postulated by our systems (50a,3)

2.1311121111121 Demonstration of the reasoning which refutes, in brief (50a,4) V.3

2.1311121111122 Extensive explanation of this (51a,4)

2.13111211111221 Non-acceptance of a subsequent object of a previous cognition (51a,5) V.4

2.13111211111222 Refutation by non-acceptance if it is not subsequent (55b,4)

2.131112111112221 The consequence that an unconditioned object would be momentary (55b,5) V.5

2.131112111112222 Demonstration that there is a contradiction if this is accepted (56a,2)

2.1311121111122221 The consequence that it would be conditioned if it were dependent (56a,2) V.6

2.1311121111122222 The consequence that it would be eternally existent or non-existent if it were not dependent (56a,5) V.7

2.131112111113 Summary of the refutation of an eternal entity (57a,3) V.8

2.13111211112 Refutation of the unitariness in truth of the person (58b,4) V.9

2.1311121112 Refutation in general of the unitariness in truth of pervasive entities (61a,2) V.10a-b

2.131112112 Refutation of the unitariness in truth of non-pervasive entities (62a,2)

2.1311121121 Refutation of the unitariness in truth of an independently existing object (62a,2)

2.13111211211 Refutation of the unitariness in truth of macroscopic objects (62a,3) V.10c-d

2.13111211212 Refutation of the unitariness in truth of ultimate particles (62b,4)

2.131112112121 Demonstration of the reasoning which refutes ultimate particles (62b,4)

2.1311121121211 Statement of the initial claim (62b,5) V.11a-b

2.1311121121212 Refutation of this (64a,6)

2.13111211212121 If it is partless the macroscopic is not established (64a,6) V.11c-d, 12

2.13111211212122 If it has (parts) the ultimate particle is not established (65a,5) V.13

2.131112112122 Having refuted ultimate particles, demonstra-

tion that all particular existents have been refuted (65b,2)

2.1311121121221 Setting up the argument (65b,3) V.14

2.1311121121222 Proving the pervasion (65b,5) V.15

2.1311121122 Refutation of the unitariness in truth of the noetic (67a,2)

2.13111211221 Refutation of the unitariness in truth of the noetic in the systems which claim independently existing objects (67a,3)

2.131112112211 Refutation of each of their specific claims (67a,3)

2.1311121122111 Refutation of our two realistic systems (67a,4)

2.13111211221111 Refutation of the Vaibhāṣikas (who claim a noesis) without a noema (67a,4)

2.131112112211111 Proof that reflexive awareness is acceptable (67a,5)

2.1311121122111111 Grasping the very fact of reflexive awareness (67a,5) V.16

2.1311121122111112 Showing that one should accept that this is reflexive awareness (71b,3) V.17, 18a-b

2.131112112211112 Proving that non-reflexive, referential awareness of objects is unacceptable (73a,3) V.18c-d, 19

2.131112112211113 Demonstration that the system in which there is no noema is unacceptable (74a,4)

2.1311121122111131 The acceptance, merely conventionally, of

referential awareness of objects in (the system) with a noema (74a,5) V.20

2.1311121122111132 Demonstration that (the system) in which there is no noema is very inferior because in it even conventionally referential awareness of objects is unacceptable (74b,1) V.21

2.13111211221112 Refutation of the system of the Sautrāntikas (who claim a noesis) together with a noema (75a,1)

2.131112112211121 "The non-duality of the multiple" (75a,1)

2.1311121122111211 The consequence that the noema would be unitary like the noesis (75a,2) V.22

2.1311121122111212 The consequence that the noesis would be multiple like the noemata (75b,3) V.23a-b

2.1311121122111213 If this is not so, the refutation by the consequence that noesis and noema would be separate (75b,4) V.23c-d

2.131112112211122 Refutation of the approach (called) "Two halves of an egg" (76a,1)

2.1311121122111221 Statement of the claim (76a,1) V.24

2.1311121122111222 Refutation of this (76b,2)

2.13111211221112221 Refutation of the meaning (76b,2)

2.131112112211122211 Uncertainty of intellectual apprehension of letters (76b,3) V.25

2.131112112211122212 Uncertainty of understanding objects of discursive thought (77a,3) V.26

2.131112112211122213 Uncertainty of all intellectual apprehensions (77b,1) <u>V.27</u>

2.13111211221112222 Refutation of the example (77b,5)

2.131112112211122221 Setting up the argument (77b,5) <u>V.28</u>

2.131112112211122222 Proving the pervasion (78a,3)

2.1311121122111222221 Contradiction between the object of sight and memory (78a,3) <u>V.29</u>

2.1311121122111222222 If there are intervals a clear presence is untenable (78a,5) <u>V.30</u>

2.131112112211123 Refutation of the system known as "An equal number of noeses and noemata" (78b,4)

2.1311121122111231 Statement of the claim (78b,5) <u>V.31</u>

2.1311121122111232 Refutation of this (79a,5)

2.13111211221112321 Proof that all apprehensions would possess many noemata (79a, 5) <u>V.32</u>

2.13111211221112322 Impossibility of the unitariness in truth of that which is partless (79b,1)

2.131112112211123221 (Showing) that there is no unitary objective reference if one investigates an insentient objective referent (79b,2) <u>V.33</u>

2.131112112211123222 (Showing) its non-existence if one investigates objectifying intellect (79b,6) <u>V.34</u>

2.1311121122112 Refutation of the systems of the outsiders (80a,4)

2.131111211221121 Demonstration in general of the refutation of the Vaiśeṣikas, etc. (80a,5) V.35

2.131111211221122 Refutation of the claims of each(82a,2)

2.1311112112211221 Refutation of the Jaina and Mīmāṃsā systems (82a,2) V.36

2.1311112112211222 Refutation of the Lokāyata system (84b,3) V.37

2.1311112112211223 Refutation of the Sāṃkhya system (85b,2)

2.13111211221122231 The statement of the refutation (85b,3) V.38

2.13111211221122232 Refutation of the response which wrongly rejected (the above refutation) (86b,5) V.39

2.1311112112211224 Refutation of the Vedānta system (87a,5) V.40

2.131112112212 Summary demonstrating the impossibilty of noetic which is truly unitary, common (to these systems) (90b,3)

2.1311121122121 Refutation of adhering to unitariness regarding an independently existing object (90b,3) V.41

2.1311121122122 Refutation of unitariness in truth regarding the noetic (91a,4) V.42

2.1311121122123 Summary of the meaning of these two (91b,2) V.43

2.13111211222 Refutation of the unitariness in truth of the noetic in the system of the Vijñaptimātra who

do not accept independently existing objects (91b,4)

2.131112112221 Statement of the initial claim (91b,5) V.44

2.131112112222 Investigation of this approach (93b,2)

2.1311121122221 Investigation of its faults and benefits (93b,3) V.45

2.1311121122222 Refutation of the faulty aspect of the establishment in truth of perception (93b,6)

2.13111211222221 Refutation of the system in which the noema exists in truth (94a,1)

2.131112112222211 "The two halves of an egg" (94a,1)

2.1311121122222111 Showing the contradiction (94a,1) V.46

2.1311121122222112 Explaining how one is unable to reject this contradiction (95a,2)

2.13111211222221121 Setting forth the consequence (95a,2) V.47

2.13111211222221122 Showing that this fault is similar to that of those who (claim a noesis) together with a noema while accepting independently existing objects (95b,2) V.48

2.131112112222212 Refutation of the system of "An equal number of noeses and noemata" (96a,2) V.49

2.131112112222213 Refutation of the system of "The non-duality of the multiple" (97a,1)

2.1311121122222131 Setting forth the thesis of rejection (97a,2) V.50

2.1311121122222132 Proof of the acceptability of this (97b,3) V.51

2.13111211222222 Refutation of the system of (those who claim) the noema is false (98a,1)

2.131112112222221 Statement of the claim (98a,2) V.52

2.131112112222222 Its refutation (98a,6)

2.1311121122222221 Refutation in brief (98a,6) V.53

2.1311121122222222 Extensive explanation of its meaning (99b,6)

2.13111211222222221 Unacceptability the non-existence of a noema (99b,6)

2.131112112222222211 Unacceptability if one investigates the object of the noesis (100 a,1)

2.1311121122222222111 In general (100a,1) V.54

2.1311121122222222112 Specifically (100a,3)

2.13111211222222221121 Unacceptability of a noesis in reality (100a,4) V.55

2.13111211222222221122 Unacceptability of a noesis even merely postulationally (100b,3) V.56

2.131112112222222212 Unacceptability if one investigates their relation (101a,2) V.57

2.131112112222222213 Unacceptability if one investigates the "cause" (102a,5) V.58

2.13111211222222222 Unacceptability of only a noetic act (102b,3) V.59

2.1311121122222223 Refutation of the response which wrongly rejected (the above) (103a,5) V.60

2.13111212 Proof that there is no multiplicity in truth (106a,4) V.61

2.1311122 Proof of the pervasion (107b,1) V.62

2.13112 Demonstration of the existence of particular existents conventionally (108b,1)

2.131121 Grasping the conventional which is a mere presence devoid of existence in truth (108b,2) V.63

2.131122 Explanation and division of its essential existence (111a,3)

2.1311221 The infallible existence of mere presence (111a,3)

2.13112211 The manner of presencing (111a,4) V.64

2.131122111 The reasoning which proves momentariness (111b,4)

2.1311221111 Non-dependence (of the case of cessation of a momentary entity on another) (111b,5)

2.1311221112 Contradictoriness (of non-momentary entities) (113a,6)

2.131122112 Efficacy (114a,1)

2.13112212 The way in which (entities) are present by virtue of their "cause" (121a,3) V.65

2.1311222 Demonstrating certainty that a ground of presencing is devoid of truth status (125a,2) V.66

2.1312 Eliminating objections to grasping the way in which the Two Truths (operate) (126a,2)

2.13121 A brief demonstration of the way in which there can be no contention (with this approach) (126a,2)

2.131211 The ability to crush opponents (126a,3) V.67

2.131212 The way in which one cannot be attacked by others (126b,1) V.68

2.13122 Extensive explanation (126b,6)

2.131221 Eliminating objections regarding the ultimate (127a,1)

2.1312211 The way in which there are no assertions in the ultimate which is free from the linguistic proliferations in the four extremes (127a,1)

2.13122111 Explanation of the discursively-formulated ultimate in which assertions are made (127a,2)

2.131221111 The way this is established by reasoning and textual authority (127a,2) V.69

2.131221112 Meaning of the term (paramārtha) (127b,6) V.70a-b

2.13122112 Explanation of the non-discursive ultimate which is free from all assertions (128b,3)

2.131221121 Demonstration in brief (128b,4) V.70c-d

2.131221122 Extensive explanation (128b,6)

2.1312211221 Showing that the ultimate is beyond the object of words and concepts (129a,1) V.71,72a-b

2.1312211222 Showing that words and concepts are the realm of the conventional (135b,2) V.72c-d

2.1312212 Eliminating objections to this (136a,6)

2.13122121 If the essential existence (of entities) is open there is the consequence that it would be directly understood by all (136b,1)

2.131221211 The objection (136b,2) V.73

2.131221212 The response (136b,5) V.74

2.13122122 The consequence that the proof would be meaningless in not being understood by anyone if (entities) although open, were not present (137a,6) <u>V.75</u>

2.131221221 Yogic direct awareness which clearly understands the non-existence of an ontological principle (139a,4)

2.1312212211 Actuality (139a,4)

2.1312212212 Divisions (139a,5)

2.1312212213 Meaning of the term (139b,3)

2.1312212214 Elimination of objections (140a,2)

2.13122122141 In general (140a,2)

2.131221221411 Objection to the "cause" (140a,2)

2.1312212214111 Objection to the actuality (140a,3)

2.1312212214112 Objection to the divisions (140a,6)

2.131221221412 Objection to the result (141a,2)

2.1312212214121 Rejection (141a,3)

2.1312212214122 Objection to the intrinsic awareness which understands (141a,5)

2.14122122142 Specifically, objection to intrinsic awareness which is felt knowledge, the supreme king of all forms of direct yogic awareness (141b,3)

2.141221221421 Objection to the "cause" (141b,4)

2.131221221422 Objection to the result (142a,3)

2.13122123 Objection that the conventions of the means of proof and what is to be proven would be impossible because the property of the logical subject, etc.

would not be established if there were no essential existence (144b,1)

2.131221231 The reply (144b,2) V.76,77a-b

2.131221232 Demonstrating unacceptability if this is not so (145a,3) V.77c-d

2.131222 Eliminating objections to the conventional (145b,2)

2.1312221 Acceptance in general of means of proof and what is to be proven (145b,3) V.78

2.1312222 Specific explanation of the way in which one accepts the establishment of the co-relation of "cause" and result as previous and subsequent (147a,2)

2.13122221 Brief demonstration of the thesis (147a,2) V.79

2.13122222 Extensive proof by reasoning (147b,2)

2.131222221 Refutation of non-acceptance (147b,2) V.80,81a-b

2.131222222 Proving acceptability (of the thesis) (148a,5) V.81c-d

2.1312223 Summary by way of praising freedom from eternalism and annihilationism (149b,3) V.82

2.1313 The benefit of understanding the way in which the two truths are to be grasped (151a,2)

2.13131 The benefit of understanding no essential existence as the ultimate (151a,2) V.83

2.13132 The benefit of efficacious presence as the conventional (161a,6) V.84

2.13133 The benefit of accustoming oneself to the unity of these two (162a,6)

2.131331 Brief demonstration that pure merits can arise (162b,1) V.85

2.131332 Extensive explanation of this (163a,3)

2.1313321 General explanation of the example of positive and negative outcomes of "cause" and result (163a,4) V.86-87

2.1313322 Specific explanation of the "cause" and result occasioned and not occasioned by a pure perspective (163b,3) V.88-90

2.132 Summary which praises such a method of (grasping) the two truths (165a,1)

2.1321 Setting forth the two approaches (165a,1)

2.13211 Setting forth the conventional just as it is (165a,2) V.91

2.13212 Setting forth the path by uniting the two approaches (165b,6) V.92

2.1322 Praise of this (166a,5)

2.13221 Brief demonstration (166a,5) V.93

2.13222 Extensive explanation (168a,2)

2.132221 Qualities of this extra-ordinary (approach) (168a,3) V.94-95

2.132222 The benefit of giving rise to other positive qualities based on this (172a,5)

2.1322221 The benefit of giving rise to compassion for sentient beings (172a,6) V.96

2.1322222 The benefit of giving rise to devotion to the teacher

(173b,3) V.97

2.14 Conclusion (175a,4)

2.141 Colophon of the ācārya (175a,4)

2.142 Colophon: the translators (175b,1)

2.2 Final remarks by Mi-pham (175b,6)

(Mi-pham's reply to the criticisms of rDo-grub dom-chos begins 180b,1. This is not noted in the table of contents for Vol.nga of his gsung-'bum as reproduced by Sonam Kazi.)

Appendix 3

Mi-pham on *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX, 2[1]

All of these entities which are summed up by the process of refinement are claimed to reside within the two 'truths' of the ultimate, i.e., openness, non-thematic meaningfulness (*chos-nyid*) just as it *is*, and the conventional, i.e., thematized beings (*chos-can*) in their manifoldness which are a mere ontic presence. As the *Pitāputrasamāgamanasūtra* states:

> 'These two 'truths' which are known in the world, you know for yourself without hearing them from another. They are the conventional and ultimate 'truths'; there is no third.'

While the conventional is the ontic mode of presence (*snang tshul*) which is like a hair before the eyes, a dream, an apparition, a presence before one although not existing in actuality as somethihg having come into existence, etc.; if one examines this presence as to its essential existence, the existential mode of Being (*gnas-tshul*) (of this presence) which is devoid of coming into being, etc., is the ultimate. The *Madhyamakāvatāra* states:[2]

> 'All particular existents partake of two modes of being, obtained by seeing them truly or erroneously. The domain of true seeing is the ultimate itself, and erroneous seeing is known as the conventional truth.'

Therefore, if these two truths are furthermore (held to be) conventionally one and ultimately separate, one should know, just as it is spoken of in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*,[3] that four faults (arising from this conception) are to be countered in four ways.

Now as to the ultimate, since 'to be devoid of,' which is a mere explicit negation, i.e., there is no coming into being, no abiding, etc., which has negated coming into being, abiding, etc., is merely the gate of entry into releasement from the four extremes, i.e., Great Openness, it is designated 'the discursively formulated ultimate' or 'the approximately ultimate (mthun-pa'i don-dam).' The Madhyamakālaṃkāra states:[4]

> 'Since it is in accord with the ultimate, it is called "ultimate."'

Since those who have been habituated to an obsessive concern with particular existents since beginningless time have no opportunity to give birth to pristine cognitiveness which is free from the four extremes, first, it is necessary (for them) to activate appreciative discernment, which is a mental event that discerns all particular existents as being just non-existent ultimately. Therefore, in all the basic texts of the Svātantrikas, all the aspects of explicit negation of form and so on (taught) in the sūtras and śāstras, having been explained as being of discursive meaning, (i.e.) just the non-existence which refutes ontically ultimate existence (bden grub); apart from this one needn't assert again a negation as the ultimate meaning, the presence of Being (gnas-lugs). As the Madhyamakālaṃkāra states:[5]

> 'Since coming into being, etc., are impossible, no coming into being, etc., are impossible.'

And the Satyadvaya (vibhāga):[6]

> 'Ultimately, it is clear there is no negation.'

And so, at the time of setting forth the incidental path (gnas-skabs lam), since it is not necessary to negate presence which seems to come into being conventionally although ultimately there is no coming into being, entities are established by conventional logical means as upholding their essential properties (rang-gi mtshan-nyid) conventionally. And since this seeming presence is not established ultimately, that which is to be refuted relates specifically to the ultimate, and thus we make the explanation, 'while ultimately non-existent, conventionally infallibly existent.' Therefore, such a lack of meditative composure, in that the two truths are separate, is what delights the mind of the beginner. As Ācārya Bhāvaviveka said:[7]

> 'Without the ladder of that which is ultimately
> valid conventionally,
> It would be impossible to know how to proceed to
> the upper story of the ultimate.'

Now, in the realm of the ultimate, the presence of Being, the distinction between the two characteristics of existence and non-existence, (as in the phrase) 'ultimately non-existing, while conventionally existing,' does not hold. Since form, etc., which is present itself is open, and likewise since that which is open is itself presence as form, etc., the field of Being (chos-dbyings) which is the unity of openness and presence, (is) free from the two forms of imputation. As long as one has not directly experienced this, since it is not the real appreciative discernment as a transcending function, Ācāryas Candrakīrti and Śāntideva, etc., ascertain completely (rtsal-du 'don-pa) intrinsic awareness itself as an individual

experience, pristine cognitiveness which is free from the four extremes from the very start. Therefore, since even conventionally the establishing (of entities) by means of their essential properites has been refuted, the separation of the two truths is refuted. Since presence and openness (here) become unified, by (this) essential point (gnad) which has gone beyond all affirmations of a biased view which may subsequently remain in regard to the existential mode of Being in its ultimacy, they expel, by demonstrating consequences unacceptable to an opponent yet based on his own principles (thal-'gyur), all the one-sided (affirmations of) existence and non-existence. Therefore, they are given the name 'Prāsangikas.' Excellent scholars such as Bu-ston only made this distinction between Svātantrikas and Prāsangikas in Tibet; in India it did not arise. Ultimately, although there is no distinction whatsoever, there is a distinction based on the method of explanation in the basic texts. For example, Bhāvaviveka ascribes the error of not applying the qualification, '(from the) ultimate (point of view),' to what was to be refuted, to the work of Buddhapālita, and Candrakīrti refuted (this criticism). Therefore, although there is no difference whatsoever in regard to the main point which is the ultimate intent of these two great approaches of the Svātantrikas and Prāsangikas, the complete ascertainment of the discursively-formulated and non discursive ultimate (truth) is merely a method of explanation. One should look into (my) Explanation of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra

for an extensive (discussion of this).

Here in the Prāsangikas, since they ascertain completely the Great Madhyamaka which is free from linguistic proliferation (spros-pa), the unity (of presence and openness), one should know that there is no distinction into the two forms of ultimate (truth), the discursive and the non-discursive according to their method. Some people say that the noble pristine cognitiveness is the real non-discursive ultimate, and that this is free from all the prolificacy of language, while all the cultivation of openness by ordinary people is a cultivation as a mere explicit negation, which is the approximately ultimate. Here, where openness is taught, negation of form, etc., is only a non-implicative negation. Since, ultimately, implicative negation also is not in accord with the meaning of openness in so far as it is still involved with particular existents; it is just the same with non-implicative negation. Since, by presence in infallible interdependent origination, presence and openness are unified, it is necessary to destroy any holding to affirmation or negation. As it is said:

> 'If one knows that all entities are open, then that which is based on action and its result is more wondrous than wondrous, more miraculous than miraculous.'

And, according to the Pancakrama:[8]

> 'After having known presence and openness in their individual aspects, we shall explain their unity where these two are really fused.'

Although others say that while this is cultivation ac-

cording to the Mantric path, it is not that of the sūtras, (we reply) that there are no distinctions in the field of Being apart from the differences in method of those who specialize in efficacious methods and those who cultivate by an intellectual examination this unity which is beyond the four extremes. Now, (at first) one can't eliminate all at once the four extremes by means of the contemplative inquiry of an ordinary person which inquires into the presence of Being.[9] But, having refuted the four (extremes) in turn, if you haven't brought about an insight into the unitary field of Being which is non-objectifiable, then, just as a stalk is the result of a barley seed, because even the noble pristine cognitiveness won't come about in the absence of a cause, why would anyone not cultivate it even at the (stage) of the preparatory and applicatory (paths)? Therefore, the ultimate, the existential mode of Being of particular existents, is not in the sphere of (representational) thinking, since it is free from all the extremes of existence, non-existence, both, and neither. (Representational) thinking and language are the conventional (truth), since they are not ultimate. Objectifications and intentions by thought of 'this and that,' and what is articulated by the words 'this and that,' these entities which come under the sphere of speech and intending mind, if investigated, never will withstand a critique, in that they are open like an apparition, since they are devoid of the characteristics (they are represented to have).

Therefore, it is said by the Buddha in a sūtra:

> 'Devaputra, if the ultimate truth were in the sphere of activity of body, speech, and thought, it would not come under the rubric of ultimate, but under that of the conventional. Devaputra, the ultimate truth is beyond all designation, truly it neither comes into being nor ceases, and is free from (the dualities of) knowing and the knowable, that which designates and that which is designated. To go beyond (even) the object of pristine cognitiveness which is sensitive to all the finest aspects (of reality), is the ultimate truth.'

Also, the Madhyamakālaṃkāra states:[10]

> "Ultimately, this is freedom from the host of proliferations of language. If one bases oneself on conceptualization, it is the conventional and not the real."

In regard to this, here (in this treatise), the explanation that non-thematic meaningfulness (chos-nyid) is not an object of knowledge (is as follows): since non-thematic meaningfulness is beyond all linguistic proliferation, it is not to be objectified by representational thinking. In that it cannot be established as any characteristic whatsoever and doesn't become a subject or an object, ultimately, how can one call it something knowable? As it is said:[11]

> 'Sentient beings merely use the expression, '(I) see space,' but how can one see space? One should examine the matter and in this way see (all) entities, as it was taught by the Tathāgata. He is not able to indicate (this) seeing by another example.'

Notes to Appendix 3

1. For the edition of the text used, see Introduction, note 5. The text begins on f.4,1.

2. Madhyamakāvatāra VI,23, Poussin ed. (St. Petersburg: Royal Academy of Sciences, 1912), Biblioteca Buddhica IX, p. 102.

3. Samdhinirmocanasūtra III,3.

4. MAl v.70a-b.

5. MAl v.71a-b.

6. Satyadvayavibhāga 9d.

7. Madhyamakahṛdaya-tarkajvālā III,12.

8. Pancakrama VI,13.

9. Cf. Go-ram-pa, lTa-ba'i shan-'byed, f.39b,3.

10. MAl, v.70c-d, 72c-d.

11. See H.V. Guenther, trans., The Jewel Ornament of Liberation (London: Rider & Co., 1959), p.259.

Appendix 4

Profound Instructions for Understanding the Madhyamaka[1]

I. The previous understanding

When, as a result of the previous process of inquiry and refinement, you have brought about certainty in regard to the crucial point, the non-existence of the personality as an abiding Self, then, in the same way as you have made an analytical investigation based on the five psycho-physical constituents of a previously unexamined 'I', analytically investigate all that is, the five psycho-physical constituents and the unconditioned, (knowing) 'this is this, this is this.'

II. The Ultimate 'Truth' which can be logically formulated (rnam-grangs-pa'i don-dam)

Although they are apprehended as various entities, if you pursue the investigation you won't find any actual referent (btag-don) for what has been investigated. You won't find, even microscopically, the two ultimate indivisibles (particles and momentary mental acts), which come-to-presence in contextual dependence: particular entities come about contextually and abstractions are postulated contextually. When whatever previously unexamined particular entity or abstraction is taken up and investigated as 'this' and 'that', know it to be a presence without being anything, without a root or foundation, like an

apparition, a dream, a reflection of the moon in water, an echo, a city in the sky, a double image, a mirage, etc. It is a presence while being open, and an openness while being present. This meditation on presence and openness as an apparition, is (what is meant by) the Ultimate 'Truth' which can be logically formulated.

III. The Ultimate 'Truth' which cannot be logically formulated

You who have this certainty of understanding, although indeed it is the stainless discernment which regards (everything) which arises during post-meditative experience as an apparition, are still not free from the objective references (dmigs-pa) which constitute the noematic pole (gzung-ba'i dmigs); neither have you destroyed the noesis ('dzin-pa'i rnam-pa). Since you have not passed beyond conceptualizing, you don't see the real (chos-nyid) which is free from discursiveness (spros-bral). If, when such a certainty of understanding arises - although through an analytical investigation you apprehend (everything) as a mere apparition and there is indeed a noema - because the existence of this noema cannot be established, and thus the noesis cannot be found, you have begun to settle in the uninterrupted creativity (lhug-pa'i gshis) which cannot be appropriated.

When you are thus composed (in this creativity which cannot be appropriated), although all internal and

external presences continue uninterrupted, because (of the fact that) from the very outset whatever is postulated as an entity neither arises nor ceases, (these presences) abide in (a mode of) non-referential identity (<u>mnyam</u>) in the continuum of the Sameness of Being (<u>mynam-nyid kyi dbyings</u>). In this self-manifesting meaningfulness (<u>don gyi rang-babs</u>), beyond the realm of discourse and free from the ascriptions of existence and non-existence, there arises apodictic experience (<u>the-tshoms med-pa'i nyams myong</u>). It is just this non-thematic meaningfulness (<u>chos-nyid</u>) of all entities (<u>chos</u>) which is the Ultimate 'Truth' which cannot be logically formulated; (it is) conceptless pristine cognitiveness, a meditative composure as an intrinsic awareness which is specific. (The practice of) accustoming yourself to the range of this experience is (called) the yoga of the Great Mādhyamika; (it is to be understood as) the presence of Being, the indivisibility of the two 'Truths' and the unity of contextual dependence and openness.

IV. The Method of Practice

If you want to quickly experience this non-dual pristine cognitiveness which is beyond the range of the mind, cultivate the oral instructions of the Mantrayāna, for this (cultivation) is the consummate profound point (<u>zab gnad mthar-thug</u>) of the Mādhyamika meditative stages.

Alternatively, having first inquired into and refined (your experience), you can then develop your experience in stages. Then, having travelled the path with the understanding of the apparitionalness of presence and openness, you will become free in the Sameness of Being, (which is) the continuum of discernment as a transcending function that does not (engage in) affirmation or negation.

In the *sūtras* it is stated that intellectual understanding is like this: if someone who is tormented by thirst just knows that there is water around, this doesn't quench his thirst. But if he drinks, then his thirst is quenched. Thus, the thirsting after merely intellectual understanding will only exhaust you in (the acquiring of) a lot of 'learning' (*rig-pa*). If you have cultivated step by-step, there is no need to (ineffectually) change from (one study to another) - you will quickly obtain profound compliance (*zab-mo'i bzod-pa*) (to Being).

Notes to Appendix 4

1. The text is to be found at the back of Tibetan Nyingma Meditation Center, Calm and Clear (Emeryville: Dharma Press, 1973). The translation contained therein completely obscures the division into the two forms of ultimate truth.

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